COPYRIGHT’S LAW OF DISSEMINATION

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ABSTRACT

Intellectual property generally rests on the assumption that markets will bring about an ideal allocation of resources. Nonetheless, copyright law remains riddled with regimes that bypass or restructure normal market licensing between copyright owners and distributors such as streaming services, radio stations, and libraries. This Article provides the first comprehensive account of this “law of dissemination,” examining how a range of seemingly unrelated judicial doctrines, statutory safe harbors, and regulatory institutions together affect the relationship between copyright owners and the entities that disseminate creative works to the public.

While these regimes are often treated as unintelligible historical relics, they make more sense than many believe. The Article argues that copyright has a particular set of policy concerns related to the dissemination of creative works for the public’s consumption, enjoyment, and personal use. In particular, four interrelated goals can be seen to varying degrees throughout copyright’s many dissemination-regulating institutions: (1) facilitating exchanges in transaction cost-heavy contexts, (2) enabling more efficient and expansive public access to existing creative works, (3) reducing barriers to entry for innovative forms of distribution in concentrated markets, and (4) furthering distributive-justice priorities.

Identifying these four goals and examining how they permeate the copyright system is a necessary first step in remedying many of the problems currently faced by copyright’s law of dissemination, particularly its increasingly outmoded, piecemeal, and inconsistent regulatory design. By diagnosing these challenges and their potential roots, the Article provides grounding for assessing how copyright law can be reformed to fit a world of almost entirely digital dissemination.

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INTRODUCTION

Copyright, like other forms of property, uses markets to facilitate the efficient allocation of resources. By vesting exclusive rights in the authors of creative works, the copyright system generally assumes that owners will bargain with downstream users and exchange licenses for royalty payments. Building off of this logic, Paul Goldstein and other have argued that licensing markets, rendered increasingly efficient by digital technologies, “offer[] the surest prospect for the production and consumption of creative works in the widest possible variety and at the lowest possible price.”

And yet, even as new technologies have rendered copyright licensing more efficient, many copyright industries continue to operate in highly regulated environments. In a variety of different contexts, a collection of complex judicially-managed exceptions to liability and regulatory price-setting mechanisms control the prices paid to copyright owners by the companies that distribute creative works to the public. Thanks to these mechanisms, digital radio stations like Pandora pay government-set royalties to record labels; new technologies for accessing aspects of creative works, like Google Books, pay no royalties at all; satellite TV services pay government-set royalties to rebroadcast network and cable television; and libraries pay no royalties when they lend books or copy book chapters for users—and these are just a few examples.

The Article provides the first comprehensive account of all of the ways copyright law bypasses market licensing to regulate the relationship between copyright owners and the many different entities that distribute or enable distribution of copyrighted works to the public on a mass scale, i.e. disseminators. The Article argues that we need to start understanding copyright as having a cohesive approach to dissemination—a “law of

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1 See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 414 (2003) (“Markets and property rights go hand in hand. Property rights provide the basic incentives for private economic activity and also the starting point for transactions whereby resources are shifted to their most valuable use.”); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1604 (1982) (“[T]he copyright system creates private property in creative works so that the market can simultaneously provide economic incentives for authors and disseminate authored works.”).


3 See infra Part I.
“dissemination” with its own set of normative goals—even if this is not readily apparent when looking at the complex web of doctrines and institutionally disjointed regulations that make up modern copyright law. And, though it was primarily crafted in a pre-digital age, this law of dissemination remains vital to ensuring that new digital technologies, such as streaming, can continue to benefit the public.

While many have discussed some aspects of this law of dissemination, a coherent articulation has proven elusive. Scholars have tended to downplay the importance of copyright’s regulatory mechanisms, treating them as sui generis and unrelated to the copyright system writ large. For many, these regimes are either outmoded relics of no-longer-existent market failures or explainable primarily as responses to industry lobbying rather than any coherent policy agenda.

This is not to say that copyright’s judicial “limitations and exceptions” are not a subject of frequent discussion; much ink has been spilled on the many doctrines that limit the scope of a copyright interest, allowing certain uses to occur without permission of the copyright owner. Scholars and judges frequently conceive of copyright as reflecting a tradeoff: copyright uses exclusive rights to incentivize the creation of new creative works, but also limits these rights in order to ensure that the public has sufficient access to creative content. But the full scope of the “access” side of this incentives-access tradeoff remains underexplored. Most frequently discussed is the importance of ensuring that new creators can employ existing works, through active adaptation, cooption, or the simple use of the raw materials of creativity. Principles like the fair use doctrine,

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5 Important work by Jessica Litman and others has shown that changes to copyright law have often consisted of industry compromises adopted carte blanche by Congress. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 35-63, 122-140 (2006) (describing political economy of copyright legislation at various points in history). This Article certainly does not dispute such history, but argues that even if many of these regimes may have been born out of industry concerns, their actual operation may still sometimes reflect some coherent policy goals. See infra Part II.


7 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 997 (1997) (“As countless economists have demonstrated, efficient creation of new works requires access to and use of old works.”); Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for
which excuses liability for certain new productive uses, and idea-expression dichotomy, which prevents authors from asserting control over the basic ideas that underlie their works, help police this line. This ensures that copyright does not restrict new creation and thus undermine its own reason for being.

While certainly an essential feature of the copyright system, this concern with new creativity is not the only story behind how and why copyright bypasses market-based licensing to enable public access. While something like the fair use doctrine might step in to allow me to transform the melody of a song into a brand new work, such as a parody, there are many other regimes within the copyright system that enable me to simply enjoy that song in an easily accessible manner, such as on the radio or via a streaming service. This Article focuses on this more passive side of copyright’s access agenda: the public’s interest in consuming, enjoying, and learning from cultural works.

In this respect, this Article attempts to provide something that all of these existing accounts—defenses of pure free-market licensing, political economy-based critiques of copyright’s regulatory regimes as outmoded, and defenses of copyright limitations for the sole purpose of enabling cumulative creativity—have lacked: a comprehensive picture, transcending the regulatory and judicial spaces, of all the ways copyright controls dissemination, as well as an articulation of the specific policy agenda that is served by these regimes.

First, in Part I, the Article outlines and categorizes the seemingly unrelated regimes that make up copyright’s law of dissemination. Copyright law employs a range of highly specific exceptions to copyright liability for certain forms of dissemination (such as for reproduction and distribution of works to the visually impaired), judicially delineated safe harbors, and regulatory regimes run out of the administrative state. While scholars have noted the gradual increase of copyright regulation in general terms, the operation of these different mechanisms are rarely put in conversation with one another. Doing so reveals a system that affects large-scale dissemination in a variety of interrelated contexts. Though differences emerge in how these mechanisms affect price (zero-price carveouts vs. price regulation), the

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*Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?,* 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1383, 1387 (2014) (discussing copyright’s concerns with “new creativity”).
9 See infra Part I (describing various ways the dissemination of music is regulated).
10 As discussed below, this aspect of copyright’s policy agenda can be conceived of in allocative efficiency terms or through a more normatively pluralistic framework. See infra Part II.
institutional actors involved (courts vs. regulatory agencies), and the level of control used (supplanting of market-based licensing vs. default rules that impact the price copyright owners can charge in negotiation), the effects of these regimes on dissemination are more comparable than is immediately obvious.

Second, in Part II, the Article argues that the regulation of dissemination is in fact a necessary feature of a sound copyright system. Copyright’s dissemination-related regimes can be understood to reflect four distinct but interrelated policy goals that emerge from some prevailing theoretical accounts of intellectual property and innovation policy. First, some of copyright’s market-regulatory mechanisms simply enable exchanges in situations where high transaction costs—especially the need to license with many disparate rightsholders—make dissemination difficult. Though often overemphasized by scholars, 12 this transaction costs-remediation goal explains certain elements of copyright’s law of dissemination, but not all. Second, copyright’s law of dissemination helps further forms of dissemination that expand or enhance the public’s ability to consume creative works. In so doing, the regime counterbalances some of the inherent distributional harms caused by copyright’s grant of exclusive rights in nonrivalrous works of information. 13 Third, some of copyright’s regulatory mechanisms appear to be focused on the overall structure of dissemination industries, and, in particular, problems that can emerge when certain copyright owners accumulate large portfolios of copyrighted works and use their market power to block new disseminators from entering the market. These aspects of copyright’s law of dissemination seem to reflect an antitrust-adjacent “entry policy” that helps reduce barriers to entry for new, innovative dissemination technologies. 14 Fourth, some of the more unusual features of copyright’s law of dissemination, in particular its focus on uses by public libraries, public broadcasters, and disability-centered non-profits, are best

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12 See infra Part II.A.
13 For example, the fair used doctrine and compulsory license rate setting have both been used to promote technologies that enhance user access to copyrighted works without overly compromising copyright’s goal of incentivizing creativity. See infra Part II.B.
14 Several scholars have outlined aspects of this entry policy in prior work. See Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 278 (2004); Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 Antitrust Bull. 423 (2002); see also Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Unfair Disruption, 100 B.U. L. Rev. 71 (2020) (considering IP as part of the law’s general approach to industry disruption); Peter Lee, Reconceptualizing the Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Shaping Industry Structure, 72 Vand. L. Rev. 1197 (2019). The Article argues, however, that these accounts are only one feature of a more expansive normative agenda. See infra Part II.
explained by considering priorities related to distributive justice, rather than allocative efficiency alone.\(^{15}\)

Despite their distinct emphases, these goals share a concern with remedying barriers to public access, enjoyment, and utilization of creative works facilitated by copyright’s system of exclusive rights. Accordingly, all are also in some tension with copyright’s overarching purpose of financially incentivizing the creation of new works. In this respect, many features of copyright’s law of dissemination function by helping weigh these four goals against copyright owners’ interest in maintaining control over the use and price of their works and, relatedly, the social value of new creation generally.\(^{16}\)

The existing tools employed in this balancing act are quite blunt; from an institutional design perspective, many of copyright’s dissemination-related mechanisms are far from optimal when it comes managing the complex tradeoffs between incentivizing creativity and furthering the four goals described above. Some of the existing regimes may even be actively thwarting these goals. As Part III examines, articulating and delineating these four goals is thus a necessary first step in the process of diagnosing the growing problems with copyright’s law of dissemination and proposing solutions. As policymakers have failed to think comprehensively about copyright’s approaches to dissemination (or recognize how various regulatory regimes or liability rules might be serving multiple goals), copyright’s law of dissemination has grown increasingly complex, inconsistent, and untethered from sound policy. Perhaps most problematically, the law has failed to keep pace with the rapid technological change brought about by digitization, including the rise of online streaming. In this respect, as Part III also explores, the reframing suggested by this Article aims to lay the groundwork for future proposals for how copyright’s law of dissemination can be modified to operate more efficiently and to better accommodate new forms of distribution and consumption.

I. COPYRIGHT’S REGULATION OF DISSEMINATION

What does it mean to articulate a copyright-specific approach to dissemination? Copyright is predominantly concerned with the creative process: by establishing a property entitlement that vests in creators, copyright aims to provide financial incentives for the production of new, socially valuable creative works. But copyright’s range of doctrines and institutions also have direct and indirect effects on the downstream transactions through which copyrighted works reach members of the public.

\(^{15}\) See infra Part II.D.

\(^{16}\) See infra Part II (exploring this goal in more detail).
for their consumption. In some instances, copyright owners themselves distribute their works directly to the public; for example, book publishers frequently own copyrights and also print and distribute books for sale. But, in many other instances, third parties fill this disseminator role—radio stations, streaming services, libraries, e-book vendors, and many more. This relationship between copyright owners and third-party distributors is the primary subject of this Article.

To disseminate a copyrighted work, a disseminator must obtain legal authority from copyright owners. They often do by directly negotiating licenses in exchange for royalty payment. But copyright also employs a number of legal mechanisms that directly or indirectly regulate the relationship between rightsholders and disseminators. These regimes stretch across a range of industries, technologies, and forms of creative works. They are also administered using a wide array of institutional arrangements.

This Part provides a comprehensive description of these mechanisms, dividing them into four categories. The first category contains carveouts from copyright protection for a specific kind of dissemination, explicitly outlined in the Copyright Act. Second, there is a range of judicially delineated exceptions to liability that provide de facto safe harbors to certain forms of dissemination; the specific contours of these exceptions are frequent subjects of litigation. The third category includes a collection of administrative state-based regimes that regulate license prices in certain industries. Fourth, there are several regimes that include unusual combinations of statutory carveouts, judicial oversight, and direct regulation and thus do not fall neatly into any category. After introducing these mechanisms, some of their commonalities and differences are assessed.

A. Statutory Carveouts

The Copyright Act contains numerous provisions that identify specific uses by specific actors as exempt from liability. While most of these provisions affect only one-off uses of specific works—for example, by religious institutions during religious services or by non-profit research institutions engaged in preservation17—that, in effect, allow public dissemination of copyrighted works on a large scale without a license: the exception for terrestrial radio sound recording performances, the exception for distribution to the visually impaired, and the library patron research exception.

17 17 U.S.C. § 110(3) (religion institutions); 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)-(c) (archival activities); see also, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (educational institutions for teaching purposes); 17 U.S.C. § 110(4) (certain charitable events); 17 U.S.C. § 110(6) (agricultural or horticultural fairs); 17 U.S.C. § 110(10) (veterans’ associations).
1. Broadcast Radio Performance of Sound Recordings

The Copyright Act provides special rules for a “sound recording:” essentially a recording of music that is able to be reproduced (such as through a record, CD, or digital file) or transmitted (such as via the radio). Most importantly, the Act explicitly states that audio public performance of sound recordings can occur without a license, unless the song is being transmitted digitally. The main consequence of this rule is that conventional broadcast radio stations can play any recorded song without permission of the recording artist or record label that owns the copyright. This exception is limited only to stations that broadcast on the AM or FM frequency radio spectrum; it does not apply to any internet-based form of dissemination, such as music streaming, or to satellite radio.

2. Publication to the Print Disabled

Sections 121 and 121a of the Copyright Act provides detailed exceptions to copyright’s reproduction right designed to allow the visually impaired to access works. Most importantly, these provisions permit nonprofit organizations or governmental agencies to publish and distribute literary or musical works in “accessible formats” without a license. While this rule was previously interpreted to allow only Braille reproduction, recent

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19 17 U.S.C. §§ 114(a), (d)(1).
20 17 U.S.C. § 106(6); see also discussion infra Part I.C.1 (explaining special rules for digital performances).
22 See infra Part I.C. The history of the broadcast radio exception is complex. Sound recordings were traditionally exempted from copyright protection entirely. In 1971, Congress established copyright protection for the duplication and sale of sound recordings, but declined to establish a public performance right. In effect, this meant that the sale or copying of a record required permission of the copyright owners, but the broadcast of a song did not. Congress later narrowed this rule, establishing that “digital” transmission of sound recordings through the internet or via satellite would require payment to copyright owners—discussed further below—but terrestrial broadcast radio continued to be exempted. See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971); Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114-15).
23 As long as their primary mission relates to serving the disabled. 17 U.S.C. § 121(d).
changes in the Marrakech Treaty Implementation Act of 2018\textsuperscript{25} clarified that any use that facilitates access for a person with any kind of visual impairment (for example, Braille, large print text, or audio files) are permitted.\textsuperscript{26}

The full scope of these provisions—what dissemination entities they apply to and what kinds of copies they permit—have seldom been considered by the courts. The most important case on this topic involved the Hathitrust Digital Library (HDL), a repository for digitized books created by a group of university libraries. In wide-ranging litigation, the courts were asked to consider whether several features of this repository infringed the copyrights of book publishers. One issue was whether HDL’s and the University of Michigan’s use of the repository to provide print-disabled patrons with digital read-aloud copies of books was permissible.\textsuperscript{27}

The district court determined this service was not infringing, grounding its decision in both Section 121 and the fair use doctrine.\textsuperscript{28} Among other things, the court found that HDL and the University of Michigan were the kinds of entities contemplated by Section 121 and that their activities were covered by the exemption.\textsuperscript{29} The Second Circuit affirmed only on fair use grounds, declining to explicitly consider whether the use was covered by Section 121.\textsuperscript{30} Nonetheless, the court’s decision in effect read the fair use doctrine through the lens of Section 121, arguing that Congress’s explicit “intent that copyright law make appropriate accommodations for the blind and print disabled”—manifested in the various pieces of legislation that gave rise to Section 121—provided grounding for the conclusion that HDL’s services for the print-disabled was permissible.\textsuperscript{31}

3. Distribution of Single Copies by Libraries

Thanks to Section 108 of the Copyright Act, a library may, without a license, copy and distribute parts of books or periodicals to a user at their request.\textsuperscript{32} Libraries can of course also loan physical copies of books to the public thanks to the first sale doctrine, discussed further below, which allows an owner of a physical object embodying a copyrighted work (like a book) to

\textsuperscript{26} 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.07[B][2] (2020)
\textsuperscript{27} Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2014)
\textsuperscript{28} Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).
\textsuperscript{29} Id.
\textsuperscript{30} Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 102, n.7 (2d Cir. 2014).
\textsuperscript{31} Id. at 102-103.
\textsuperscript{32} 17 U.S.C. § 108(d).
sell or loan it without permission of the copyright owner. But this loan privilege does not permit copying, and Section 108 of the Copyright Act explicitly exempts libraries from liability for making and distributing certain copies of works: specifically, a single article or chapter from a larger book or periodical, and an entire written work may if the library determines that the work cannot be obtained at a “fair price.” These exemptions only apply if the library has reason to believe the use is for “private study, scholarship, or research.”

The Section 108 exemptions were created in the 1976 Copyright Act, which appeared to have only contemplated analogue copying. Thus, their application to digital exemptions is limited; for example, they do not permit digital copying and distribution outside the premises of a library. Because of these limitations, many of the cases dealing with general digital reproduction of copyrighted works have relied solely on the fair use doctrine—discussed further below—and the scope of Section 108 has seldom been adjudicated.

B. Judicial Exemptions

The scope of copyright law is most commonly determined through infringement lawsuits. While the vast majority of such cases deal with uses of specific creative works—for example, the unauthorized reproduction of a photograph or the creation of an unauthorized sequel to a book—some cases also deal with large-scale uses of copyrighted works by distributors or on

36 17 U.S.C. § 108(d)(1), (e)(1). The library must include a specific copyright warning with the copy and may also only make “isolated and unrelated,” rather than “systematic,” reproduction of a work. 17 U.S.C. § 108(g); see also 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.03[2][f][i] (2020). Private entities are not eligible to make use of these provisions. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Section 108 of Title 17: A Discussion Document of the Register of Copyrights at 14 (September 2017) [hereinafter Section 108 Discussion Document], https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section108/discussion-document.pdf.
38 For example, in recent litigation between publishers and the non-profit Internet Archive over digitization and distribution of copyrighted works during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Internet Archive appears to be relying predominantly on the fair use doctrine as a defense to infringement allegations. See Answer, Hachette Book Group, Inc. v. Internet Archive, https://www.eff.org/files/2020/10/09/33_answer.pdf.
platforms. Through such cases, the courts have administered a number of defenses to liability that operate in effect as safe harbors that permit large-scale dissemination of copyrighted works without a license. While many of these exceptions are listed in the Copyright Act, their open-endedness and general applicability—in contrast to the highly specific exceptions described in the last Section—makes their scope and application a frequent subject of judicial decision making. This Section provides an overview of these limitations and explores how their contours have frequently shifted through judicial interpretation.

1. Fair Use

Copyright’s fair use doctrine is the most widely used mechanism for selectively limiting a copyright owner’s ability to control the use of her works. Originally a common law doctrine, fair use was codified in the 1976 Copyright Act, but its scope has continued to change through judicial reinterpretation. 39

Fair use allows defendants in infringement actions to be excused from liability as long as they meet the requirements of a set of four factors. 40 While many different activities can qualify as fair use, 41 the concept of “transformative use” has begun to overwhelmingly guide judges’ application of the four-part test. In particular, the transformative use test views fair use as resting on whether the new use “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character” without overly harming the copyright owner financially. 42 Creative activities that involve the repurposing of existing expression are the most frequent subject of transformative fair use. The quintessential example is a parody: the Supreme Court has held that a parody “shed[s] light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creat[es] a new one” and does so without “affect[ing] the market for the original. . . by acting as a substitute,” and thus is permissible under the fair use doctrine. 43 Recent years, however, have seen the extension of transformative use to non-expressive mass-scale uses by new technologies. As I have documented in prior work, these “utility-expanding” fair use cases have

43 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580, 591.
found that a use can be “transformative if it provides information about the original, ‘or expands its utility.’”

While many such cases involve the creation of tools, such as search engines, that do not provide meaningful dissemination of the underlying creative works, some courts have found fair use for information-furnishing tools that also provide partial dissemination of the underlying copyrighted work. The most famous example involved the Google Books search tool. A group of publishers sued Google for digitizing their books without a license in order to create a search tool that allows users to make keyword searches of books and then view small “snippets” of the text in which the search term occurs. The Second Circuit found this to be a transformative fair use, holding that the snippet function bolsters the value of the search tool by “show[ing] the searcher just enough context surrounding the searched term to help her evaluate whether the book falls within the scope of her interest.”

In recent years, the Second Circuit has begun expanding the utility-expanding fair use line of cases in even further dissemination-related directions. Though that court had previously rejected the notion that a use that merely distributes a copyrighted work more efficiently could be transformative, the court has opened to that possibility in recent cases. In particular, Fox News v. TVEyes held that a service that provided keyword searches of televised content and several-minute-long clips of those programs was “transformative” because it helped users “access [] material with targeted precision.”

At the same time, cases like TVEyes also display the limitations of the fair use doctrine in allowing dissemination-related uses to occur without a

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45 For example, the Fourth Circuit has held that a service that enables users to detect plagiarism by cross-referencing uploaded works against a database of copyrighted written materials (without providing direct access to this material) was fair use. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 638 (4th Cir. 2009). Other cases have similarly found fair use for search tools that allow users to gather information about a work (for example, on which page of a book a certain term appears) without accessing the work itself. See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2014) (search tool for books that did not provide access to book text was transformative fair use).
46 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 218 (2d Cir. 2015); see also, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding fair use for a service that indexed internet images for search purposes but also provided the public with low-resolution versions of those images).
license. Indeed, TVEyes, despite finding the clip-viewing feature to be “transformative,” ultimately declined to find fair use. Relying primarily on the market-harm aspect of the fair use test, the court found that TVEyes “undercut” and “usurped” copyright owners’ markets, making a fair use finding inappropriate.\footnote{TVEyes, at 180.}

While the utility-expanding technology cases showcase an explicit use of the fair use doctrine to provide space for certain new dissemination technologies, the doctrine has also been used in other dissemination-enhancing ways. In particular, the doctrine has occasionally been used to supplement and bolster dissemination-related exceptions found in other parts of copyright law. For example, as discussed above, Authors Guild v. Hathitrust applied fair use to recognize a privilege for dissemination to the print-disabled that is roughly coterminous with the exception outlined in the Copyright Act.\footnote{Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).} Similarly, the library exception in Section 108 explicitly contemplates that fair use could provide further grounding for research uses.\footnote{17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4); see also Section 108 Discussion Document, supra note 36, at 14.}

2. Limitations on Secondary Liability

Copyright law’s tolerance for new forms of dissemination is often tested in infringement suits that deal with new technologies that do not directly distribute or broadcast works, but rather enable individual users to do so. Copyright law recognizes secondary liability for acts that either encourage infringement or profit off infringement without attempting to stop it.\footnote{Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005).} Technologies that enable individual users to copy and/or distribute protected works have often been sued under a secondary liability theory.

The courts have sometimes attempted to limit secondary liability for such technologies. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,\footnote{Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440 (1984).} the Supreme Court considered whether Sony’s Betamax recording technology gave rise to vicarious liability for the unauthorized copying of television shows by Betamax users. Though that case has recently been claimed as part of the utility-expanding fair use line of cases discussed above,\footnote{See Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 177 (2d Cir. 2018) (characterizing Sony as supporting the proposition that “a secondary use may be a fair use if it utilizes technology to achieve the transformative purpose of improving the efficiency of delivering content.”); Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 661 (2d Cir. 2018) (same).} its primary holding dealt with the scope of secondary liability for...
new technologies, rather than fair use. Analogizing to patent law’s rules of contributory infringement, the Court held that a copying technology that is capable of “substantial noninfringing uses” cannot be subject to secondary liability.\textsuperscript{55} The Court only then concluded that this was true of Betamax, finding that, under the fair use doctrine, individual users generally do not infringe copyright when they make copies of broadcast television shows for later viewing.\textsuperscript{56}

As commentators have noted, Sony effectively established a safe harbor for technologies designed to allow users to make personal, non-infringing uses of copyright works.\textsuperscript{57} While this safe harbor has played an important role in allowing the development of hardware, such as the VCR and DVR, it has become less influential as copyrighted content has migrated to the internet. In particular, the Supreme Court in 2004 concluded that the peer-to-peer file sharing network Grokster could not take advantage of the Sony safe harbor because of evidence it had intentionally induced users to illegally share copyrighted files.\textsuperscript{58}

The Grokster Court’s unwillingness to apply Sony to peer-to-peer file sharing platforms appears to have reflected its recognition that such technologies do more than enable small-scale personal copying. Rather, they essentially create an alternative dissemination service; even though it is still individual users who are technically doing the copying and sharing, the service creates a mechanism for enabling mass-scale distribution of copyrighted works without permission.\textsuperscript{59} But the Grokster Court took care to

\textsuperscript{56} Id. at 442-456. The Court also relied on evidence that some television producers had in fact authorized recording for time-shifting purposes. Id.
\textsuperscript{57} Samuelson, supra note 41, at 2604.
\textsuperscript{59} Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929–30, (2005) (“When a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement.”); see also infra Part II (explaining this reasoning further).
leave the Sony safe harbor in place, at least hypothetically,\(^6^0\) and its precise scope will likely continue to be litigated.\(^6^1\)

3. First Sale Doctrine

U.S. copyright law has long declined to grant copyright owners control over secondary markets for goods, like books or CDs, that embody copyrighted works. This exhaustion principle, often known as the “first sale doctrine,” allows lawful owners of copyright works to resell, lease, donate, or otherwise dispose of their copies as they see fit.\(^6^2\)

The first sale doctrine affects dissemination markets by permitting libraries and rental companies to function without permission of copyright owners and without paying fees. Once a lawful purchase of a physical book has been made, a library may loan that book to patrons without a license. The same is true of a video rental store loaning a VHS or DVD to a customer.\(^6^3\)

The first sale doctrine is explicitly limited to the resale or lending of the physical object embodying the copyrighted work. It does not provide permission for the copying of the protected work, which requires a license from the copyright owner regardless of whether the copied object is a product of resale. Thus, like the Sony safe harbor, the first sale doctrine has been significantly limited by the transition to internet-based dissemination. In a world of digital copyrighted goods transferred seamlessly from person to person via the internet, the line between a resale/loan and a copy becomes blurry. Courts that have addressed this question have essentially concluded that a “digital first sale doctrine” cannot exist without infringing the reproduction right. In Capitol Records v. Redigi, the Second Circuit considered a service that purported to allow users to “sell” and “buy” music files that had been legally acquired from vendors like iTunes. Though Redigi used technology to attempt to ensure that users could not maintain copies of their files after sale, the Second Circuit nonetheless concluded that Redigi’s

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\(^{60}\) The Court distinguished Sony by relying on the fact there appeared to be evidence that Grokster had induced infringing uses. Id. at 941. Various concurrences appeared to disagree about whether Sony should protect peer-to-peer file sharing services in the absence of such evidence of inducement. Id. See also generally 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 12.04 (2020).

\(^{61}\) Lemley & McKenna, supra note 14, at 105–06.


\(^{63}\) Picker, supra note 14, at 439-440. This rental privilege, however, does not apply to goods that embody musical recordings or computer software, like music CDs, unless a non-profit educational institution or library is the entity loaning the music or software. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b). This change was made by Congress in 1984 and 1990 thanks to music and software industry allegations that the burgeoning music and software rental markets were facilitating infringement. Menell, supra note 11, at 129–30.
system produced copies and thus cannot be covered by the first sale doctrine.\textsuperscript{64} While the court left open the possibility that a digital file could be hypothetically covered by the first sale doctrine,\textsuperscript{65} under the court’s reasoning it is difficult to envision how any such file could be “transferred” without also infringing the reproduction right.

4. Operating Outside the Scope of Copyright’s Exclusive Rights

Fair use and the first sale doctrine are defined doctrines that explicitly contemplate that, under certain circumstances, disseminators will be able to avoid paying licenses to copyright owners. But entrepreneurial technology companies can also attempt to work around the exclusive rights enumerated in Section 106 of Copyright Act in order to craft their own de facto safe harbors. By creating forms of dissemination that, they argue, do not implicate the reproduction, distribution, or public performance rights, they can attempt to evade liability and operate without licenses. Though the courts have grown increasingly skeptical of this strategy, it will likely continue to be a source of litigation.

In the early and mid-twentieth century, courts often found that new forms of dissemination did not implicate any of copyright’s exclusive rights. For example, in 1908, the Supreme Court determined that the “mechanical” copying of sheet music into player piano rolls did not implicate copyright’s reproduction right.\textsuperscript{66} Similarly, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court found that cable-based retransmission of broadcast programming did not involve “performance” of the copyrighted work within the meaning of the Copyright Act.\textsuperscript{67} Congress responded to these early cases by modifying the law to bring the new technologies within the scope of copyright.\textsuperscript{68} And following the general expansion and clarification of copyright law in the 1976 Copyright Act, such cases became less frequent. But courts have, on occasion, continued to find that some new uses do not implicate copyright’s exclusive rights. For example, in \textit{Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.\textsuperscript{64}}, the Second Circuit found that a cable company’s remote storage digital video recorder (RS-DVR) system, which allowed subscribers to make digital recordings of television shows and house them on a server, was not infringing. Among other things, the court concluded that the playback of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{64} Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 657-659 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2760, 204 L. Ed. 2d 1148 (2019).
\item \textsuperscript{65} Id. at 655 & n.10.
\item \textsuperscript{66} White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908).
\item \textsuperscript{67} Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 400 (1968); see also Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 408 (1974).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
recorded television shows through this system did not implicate the public performance right.\textsuperscript{69}

In recent years, some resourceful companies have \textit{deliberately} developed technologies with the goal of operating in the negative space outside of copyright’s exclusive rights.\textsuperscript{70} The most prominent example was the company Aereo, which created a unique system that allowed users to watch broadcast television in near-real time on digital devices. Aereo used a system of thousands of small antennas, each dedicated to a single user, to receive broadcast transmissions and then stream content directly to users over the internet. The goal of this Rube Goldberg-esque system appeared to be to take advantage of precedent, especially \textit{Cablevision}, that suggested such individual copying and private transmission is outside the scope of copyright protection.\textsuperscript{71}

Copyright owners sued and the case ultimately made its way to the Supreme Court. Aereo’s primary argument was that the use of its individuated antenna system meant that its activities fell outside the scope of copyright’s exclusive right because its streams were not “performance[s]” and were not “transmissions... to the public” as defined in the Copyright Act.\textsuperscript{72} The Supreme Court declined to accept this reasoning, concluding that Aereo was operating essentially as a cable company and that its activities thus fell within the scope of copyright’s public performance right.\textsuperscript{73} On remand, the district court enjoined Aereo from operating most of its services.\textsuperscript{74} Other recent attempts to operate a dissemination service outside the scope of copyright’s exclusive rights have also failed.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{69} Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d Cir. 2008). Notably, this decision also rested on the court’s conclusion that it was individual users who make the copies rather than the cable company itself, which served to immunize the cable company from direct and secondary liability. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{70} Kristelia García has noted that this strategy can be thought of as a kind of regulatory arbitrage. Kristelia A. García, \textit{Copyright Arbitrage}, 107 CAL. L. REV. 199, 229–31 (2019).

\textsuperscript{71} Lemley & McKenna, \textit{supra} note 14, at 93–95, 103-05.

\textsuperscript{72} 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(4).


\textsuperscript{75} Most notably, the non-profit Locast, which attempted to digitally retransmit broadcast television for free, was recently found to be within the domain of copyright’s exclusive rights and thus required to negotiate licenses. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc. v. Goodfriend, No. 19 CIV. 7136 (LLS), 2021 WL 3887592 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2021). Following this decision and a multimillion dollar judgment, Locast was forced to shut down. Edmund Lee, \textit{Locast, a nonprofit streaming service for local TV, is shutting down}, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2021).
C. Regulatory Price Setting

Most of the judge-made or managed exceptions described above operate as general defenses to liability and have only come to regulate dissemination through their application to specific large-scale uses of copyright works. But copyright law also contains dedicated regulatory regimes that manage a range of specific dissemination industries. Like the judicial safe harbors, these regimes sometimes removes copyright owner control over certain dissemination markets. But unlike the safe harbors, which provide no compensation to copyright owners, copyright’s regulatory mechanisms more often take the form of compulsory licenses or levies that provide government-determined compensation to copyright owners. Run out of the federal government’s Copyright Office and outlined in detail in the Copyright Act, this system of regulation is notoriously complex. What follows is an overview of the main regulatory mechanisms and their general functioning.

1. Music Compulsory Licenses

The most wide-ranging regulatory regime in copyright law governs the dissemination of music to the public. Understanding this complex web of regulations requires some background on the unusual nature of music copyright generally. Music, unlike other creative industries, implicates two distinct copyright interests. The underlying “musical composition” is the collection of notes, orchestration, and lyrics in a song and the “sound recording” is the specific recorded version of that song. These distinct copyrights are often owned by separate parties. A musical composition copyright will generally be owned by a composer and/or a music publisher, and a sound recording copyright will often be owned by a performing artist and/or a record label.\(^{76}\)

Most forms of music dissemination require a license from both sets of copyright owners in order to occur. To make things even more confusing, different types of music dissemination implicate different copyright interests, even if the uses seem analogous. The selling of a CD or MP3 file implicates the rights to *reproduce* and distribute the musical composition and sound recording.\(^{77}\) But the playing of a song on an AM/FM radio station, a jukebox, or a digital radio platform like Pandora implicates the separate right to *publicly perform* these copyrights.\(^{78}\) The streaming of a song on an interactive

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\(^{77}\) 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3).

streaming platform like Spotify implicates both the reproduction and performance rights.

The disjointed nature of music copyright sets the stage for the unusually piecemeal set of regulations that govern certain forms of music dissemination, but not others. What follows is a description of the three primary areas of regulation: the Section 114 compulsory license for the digital and satellite performance of sound recordings; the section 115 compulsory license for musical composition reproduction, and the Section 116 compulsory license for musical composition jukebox public performance.

Section 114. As discussed above, AM/FM radio stations are exempt from paying sound recording royalties to recording artists and records label when broadcasting a song. But thanks to legislative changes in the 1990s, the same is not true for satellite radio and digital radio services (sometimes called “webcasters” or “non-interactive streaming” services).\(^79\) Under Section 114 of the Copyright Act, these services—Sirius Radio and Pandora, for example—may publicly perform any sound recording as long as they pay a government-set royalty.\(^80\) Explicitly excluded from eligibility for the Section 114 license are “interactive” streaming services—like Spotify—which allow users to play a specific piece of music at will; these services must negotiate licensing agreements in order to use sound recordings.\(^81\)

The Section 114 compulsory license is administered by an entity known as the Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”). Consisting of three administrative judges appointed by the Librarian of Congress, the CRB is tasked with setting rates for most of the Copyright Act’s compulsory licenses. The Board’s rate-setting decisions must be approved by the Register of Copyrights and are appealable to D.C. Circuit.\(^82\)

The Section 114 regime charges the CRB with setting rates and terms for satellite and digital radio every five years.\(^83\) Industry representatives take part in adversarial proceedings during which they advocate for certain rates,

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\(^80\) Id. Section 112 of the Copyright Act also partially governs this process by allowing digital services to make temporary server copies in the course of performing the work in exchange for a compulsory rate. 17 U.S.C. § 112; see also Copyright and Music Marketplace: A Report of the Register of Copyright 46 (Feb. 2015) [hereinafter Music Marketplace Report] https://www.copyright.gov/policy/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-and-the-music-marketplace.pdf. However, as the Section 112 provisions are almost always dealt with in the context of Section 114 rate setting, this Article refers exclusively to Section 114 in describing the overall regime.

\(^81\) 17 U.S.C. § 114(d).

\(^82\) 17 U.S.C. § 801.

\(^83\) 17 U.S.C. § 114(f).
generally by presenting economic expert evidence. Ultimately, the CRB must choose a royalty that “most clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller,” though other rate-setting criteria have been used in the past. Industry representatives may avoid the rate-setting process by entering into a negotiated agreement for the 5-year rates and terms. If the CRB approves such a settlement, it becomes the official compulsory royalty rate and is binding on all covered copyright owners and services regardless of whether they took part in the negotiation.

Section 114 royalties are distributed by a non-profit entity known as SoundExchange. Like the private performance rights organizations (PROs) discussed in the next Section, SoundExchange helps facilitate licenses to digital and satellite radio platforms and arranges for the many different sound recording rightsholders to be paid. However, unlike the PROs, SoundExchange is designated by the Copyright Act as the sole entity eligible to administer Section 114 royalties.

Section 115. The oldest compulsory license in the Copyright Act, often referred to as the “mechanical license,” is outlined in Section 115. Established in 1909, the mechanical license governs the reproduction of musical composition copyrights into any “mechanically playable” form. While originally designed to cover the creation of player piano rolls, the regime now allows for the creation of any form of recorded music in exchange for a compulsory fee. The musical composition copyright owner still controls the first recording of a song; for that reason, the Section 115 license has most frequently been used to create cover versions of existing recorded music. Like the Section 114 license, Section 115 royalty rates and terms are periodically set by the CRB or via an industry-wide settlement.

Since the rise of online music dissemination, the Section 115 regime has taken on newfound importance in facilitating music dissemination. In a pre-internet world, music dissemination was relatively straightforward: a record label could utilize a private licensing agreement or the Section 115

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84 Id.
85 See infra Part II.B.
86 17 U.S.C. § 114(e).
88 Howard B. Abrams, Copyright’s First Compulsory License, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 215, 250-51 (2010)
90 Peter S. Menell, Adapting Copyright for the Mashup Generation, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 465 n.120 (2016).
regime to create a recording of a musical composition. When a record label would sell copies of this recording, embodied in a record or CD, they would pay a portion of proceeds to the musical composition copyright owner.

Internet dissemination, however, adds a new level to the distribution chain: an online retailer like iTunes or a streaming service like Spotify will generally negotiate with a record label to receive permission to digitally copy and distribute existing recorded music online. However, as this act of digital distribution also implicates the right to reproduce the underlying musical composition copyright, digital disseminators must also receive a separate license from the musical composition copyright owner. The Section 115 license has taken on a new role in allowing digital disseminators to more seamlessly “clear” such rights when distributing music.92

The recent Music Modernization Act cements this new role for the Section 115 license. The Act replaces the burdensome process for utilizing the compulsory license—which generally required separate notices for each individual piece of music used by a service—with the ability to obtain a “blanket” license for musical composition rights in essentially all recorded songs.93 The Act also requires the creation of an entity, modeled after SoundExchange, to negotiate on behalf of musical composition copyright owners and administer the distribution of Section 115 royalties.94

Section 116. The final music-related compulsory licensing regime governs the public performance of musical composition copyrights by “coin operated” music players, otherwise known as jukeboxes.95 Originally exempt from paying any royalties at all, the 1976 Copyright Act replaced this blanket exclusion with a compulsory licensing regime. While most other uses of musical compositions that implicate the public performance right—such as radio—obtain their licenses through the private performing rights organizations, discussed further below,96 jukebox owners may utilize the Section 116 regime to obtain permission to play songs. Jukebox owners and copyright owners are encouraged to arrive at royalty rates and terms via

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91 Though, for a time, it was unclear if streaming implicated the reproduction rights of musical composition copyright owners. See infra Part III.
95 17 U.S.C. § 116; see also Liu, supra note 11, at 108–09.
96 See infra Part I.D.1. Recall, however, that the rules for sound recording are quite different. Terrestrial radio is exempt from paying sound recording entirely and digital/satellite radio may pay royalties via the Section 114 license. See supra Parts I.A.1 and I.C.1.
negotiation, but the CRB is authorized to set rates in the event no agreement is reached.\footnote{17 U.S.C. § 116(b).}

### 2. Cable and Satellite Television Compulsory Licenses

The second major compulsory licensing regime outlined in the Copyright Act deals with the retransmission of broadcast television via cable (Section 111) or satellite (Sections 119 and 122). This regime is notoriously complex—even, some say, incomprehensible\footnote{Pamela Samuelson, \textit{Justifications for Copyright Limitations & Exceptions}, in \textit{COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS} 12, 26 (Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2017).}—but, in essence, it establishes that if a television network that operates on the broadcast spectrum (ABC, NBC and the like) transmits a television program, a cable or satellite provider may make its own “secondary transmission” of the program as long as they pay a regulated fee to copyright owners and comply with a Copyright Office-managed reporting system.\footnote{17 U.S.C. §§ 111(c)-(d); 119(a)-(b). The cable or satellite operator must transmit the program at the same time as the broadcast and without alternation (including providing advertisements in their entirety) to be eligible. \textit{Id}. For a helpful description of the highly complex Section 111 reporting system, see Liu, \textit{supra} note 11, at 110.}

The cable compulsory license was established in the 1976 Act as a solution to a longstanding dispute between the broadcast television industry and cable television providers, in both the courts and at the FCC.\footnote{Wu, \textit{supra} note 14, at 311-323 (describing history).} In particular, the Supreme Court held on two occasions that cable transmissions of broadcast television were not “public performances” and were thus outside the scope of copyright liability.\footnote{Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); \textit{see also supra} Part I.B.4.}

As cable, in its early days, was primarily a system for retransmitting broadcast television (rather than providing its own specialized programming), these holdings were a source of ire for copyright owners, who believed they were being deprived of valuable royalties and advertising revenue. Through Section 111, Congress facilitated an industry-negotiated compromise: cable systems could continue providing broadcast television to viewers—as they had been doing for free under the Supreme Court’s holdings—but were now required to pay a government-set fee.\footnote{Wu, \textit{supra} note 14, at 322.}

Satellite television was later provided with its own compulsory license with similar rate setting and reporting requirements.\footnote{Ellen P. Goodman, \textit{Bargains in the Information Marketplace: The Use of Government Subsidies to Regulate New Media}, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 217 (2002) (describing history of this compulsory license).}
Unlike the nebulous rate-setting criteria for the music compulsory licenses, the royalty rate requirements for the cable compulsory license are outlined in detail in the statute through a complex formula. This formula primarily uses a sliding scale\textsuperscript{104} of percentages of cable companies’ gross receipts, and is subject to minor adjustment by the CRB every five years.\textsuperscript{105} And unlike the music regime, which generally uses private or quasi-private entities for royalty distribution, the CRB is itself charged with arranging for distributing of both cable and satellite compulsory license payments, as well as adjudicating any controversies related to distribution.\textsuperscript{106}

While the music compulsory licenses have been adapted to some new technological developments, through both regulatory and legislative changes,\textsuperscript{107} the cable and satellite licenses have remained relatively fixed in the digital era.\textsuperscript{108} In particular, internet streaming companies that have attempted to take advantage of the statutory licensing provisions have been rebuffed by both the Copyright Office\textsuperscript{109} and the courts.\textsuperscript{110} Most notably, Aereo—the entrepreneurial internet rebroadcast company that was found by the Supreme Court to infringe the public performance rights of television producers—argued that it should be eligible to take advantage of the Section 111 cable license. The Ninth Circuit and other courts rejected that argument, finding that Aereo must negotiate and pay market licenses.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{104}2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.18[4][b] (2020). The sliding scale is designed to account for local vs. national broadcast markets, and the increase in advertising revenue that copyright owners can achieve with national broadcasting. \textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{105}17 U.S.C. §§ 111(d), 801(b)(2); see also Adjustment of Cable Statutory License Rate (June 4, 2020), https://app.crb.gov/document/download/22270. The CRB has a more active role in regulating the satellite compulsory license rates, though industrywide settlement is encouraged. 17 U.S.C. § 119(c).

\textsuperscript{106}17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(3).

\textsuperscript{107}See supra Part I.C.1.

\textsuperscript{108}This is not to say that Congress had not adjusted the compulsory licenses. In fact, numerous pieces of legislation have been passed to change or clarify aspects of the Section 111 and 119 licenses. But this “incessant tinkering” has only affected existing industry players, rather than expanding the licenses to new forms of dissemination. 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.18.


\textsuperscript{110}See, e.g., WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 2012).

3. Public Broadcasting Compulsory License

The music and cable/satellite compulsory licenses regulate different forms of dissemination across large, lucrative industries. But copyright law also utilizes compulsory licenses in more narrow contexts. In particular, Section 118 of the Copyright Act establishes a compulsory licensing regime for public broadcasters, defined as any “noncommercial educational” television or radio broadcast station, for the performance of musical works and certain visual artworks.112

Under this regime, a public broadcasting entity like PBS or NPR can use most musical composition copyrights without permission of the copyright owner,113 as well as broadcast depictions of visual artworks, including sculptures. The use of literary works and audiovisual works, however, is explicitly excluded from the compulsory license.114

As with the other compulsory licenses, the CRB is charged with setting rates for the Section 118 compulsory license, which they must do every five years. In lieu of setting rates, the CRB may adopt royalty terms negotiated by industry stakeholders, which take precedence over any CRB-established rates.115 The negotiated rates are binding on all industry members regardless of whether they participated in negotiations.116 If the CRB ends up setting rates on its own, its only guidance is that it “may consider the rates for comparable circumstances under voluntary license agreements negotiated” by copyright owners and public broadcasters, and presumably replicate them throughout the industry.117

In this respect, the public broadcasting provisions strongly incentivize industry-wide negotiated rates and the CRB’s main function seems to be as facilitator and approver of industry-wide settlements. The CRB has discretion

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112 17 U.S.C. § 118(c), (f). These provisions were added by the 1976 Act. Prior to 1976, public broadcasters generally did not pay licensing fees to music copyright owners on the theory that the performance right was limited only to “for profit” performances. The 1976 Act, however, removed the “for profit” qualification, meaning public broadcasters would have had to start negotiating and paying royalties in the absence of a compulsory license. Bernard Korman, Performance Rights in Music under Sections 110 and 118 of the 1976 Copyright Act, 22 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 521, 540-41 (1977).
113 Recall the unusual dual nature of music copyrights. See supra Part I.C.1. This compulsory license covers the musical composition right, but not the sound recording right. However, the exclusion of non-digital public performance means that most public broadcasting stations do not have to pay sound recording royalties anyway. See supra I.A.1. And digital performance is covered by special provisions of the Section 114 license. See supra I.C.1.
116 See Determination of Rates and Terms for Public Broadcasting (PB III), 83 FR 2739-01.
to reject industry-wide settlements based on objections, but seems to seldomly do so.  

4. Recording Device Levy

One of the more unusual regulatory interventions in copyright dissemination markets relates to technologies designed to facilitate individual copying of copyrighted works. As discussed above, the Supreme Court in the *Sony* case recognized a secondary liability safe harbor for such technologies as long as they have “substantial noninfringing uses.” But copyright owners have often attempted to narrow this rule, especially as digital technologies have made home copying more and more seamless.

One such campaign led to the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA), codified in Chapter 10 of the U.S. copyright law. The AHRA was born out of concerns of music copyright owners that newly released digital audio tape (DAT) recording technology—which provided near perfect digital copying on tapes, in contrast to the lower quality copies of analogue tape recording—would lead to a dramatic increase in individual copying of musical works and significantly harm music sales. Record companies and recording device manufacturers negotiated a compromise, which was essentially codified by Congress in the AHRA.

The AHRA immunizes consumers from direct liability for personal copying using DAT technology, as well as device manufacturers from secondary liability. In exchange, device manufacturers agreed to implement certain technological measures to prevent frequent copying and to pay a certain percentage of proceeds from sales of such technologies to copyright owners.

This recording device levy is akin to a compulsory license, but rather than providing for direct use of a copyrighted work in exchange for a compulsory fee, it protects device manufacturers from secondary liability for the actions of individual users in exchange for a fee paid by those device

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118 See 37 C.F.R. §§ 381.1-381.10. Indeed, in the most recent rate setting proceeding, *Public Broadcasting III*, which established rates for 2018 through the end of 2022, private industry parties, including PBS, NPR, and various music copyright management organizations reached a detailed agreement governing royalty rates. Despite objections from another music rights management organization, Global Music Rights (GMR), which had declined to participate in negotiation but would still be bound by the new rates, the CRB approved the settlement in its entirety. See Determination of Rates and Terms for Public Broadcasting (PB III), 83 FR 2739-01; see also Comments of GMR, https://app.crb.gov/case/viewDocument/1646.

119 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8B.01 (2020).

120 Id.

121 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1008-10.
manufacturers (and, presumably, passed on to users in the sale price for the device). In practice, device manufactures are required to pay a percentage of the sale price (2% for the actual recording device and 3% for storage media, like tapes and disks) into a centralized pool. This pool is then distributed to both musical work and sound recording copyright owners through a complex scheme administered by the Copyright Office, with disputes arbitrated by the CRB.

Despite being heralded as a solution to the market disruption posed by digital copying, the AHRA is all but irrelevant today. The tape-based digital recording technology explicitly covered by the Act never caught on, and was quickly supplanted by technologies like CD burners and MP3 players. In the first case that tested the scope of the Act, the Ninth Circuit held that such newer technologies were clearly outside the scope of the AHRA and thus not subject to the levy scheme. The Sony safe harbor stepped in to immunize such device manufacturers from secondary liability.

As the scope of the Sony safe harbor began to erode with the rise of peer-to-peer file sharing, discussed above, Napster and other file sharing platforms argued they could take advantage of the AHRA, but the courts also rejected that argument. Thus, while the AHRA remains an interesting experiment in an alternative compensation mechanism for addressing digital dissemination, it is, in practice, dead letter.

D. Other Mechanisms

The final set of dissemination-related regimes are not neatly categorizable. Some like, the ASCAP/BMI consent decrees and the DMCA safe harbor, include elements of administrative state-based regulation and elements of judicial oversight; others, like the Section 1201 exceptions, govern an area of law that might be thought of as copyright-adjacent, but still plays an important role in regulating the dissemination of creative works. What follows is an overview of these more unusual regimes.

122 Liu, supra note 11, at 116–19.
123 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003-07; see also 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8B.05 (2020).
124 Menell, supra note 11, at 130–31 (discussing history).
125 Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073 (9th Cir. 1999); see also 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8B.02 (2020) (criticizing narrow scope of the AHRA).
1. Consent Decrees

The compulsory licensing regimes described above were explicitly created through legislation and are managed by a dedicated administrative tribunal, the CRB. In contrast, the two consent decrees that govern musical licensing collectives present an example of similar market control achieved through a combination of private ordering, regulation, and judicial oversight.

Recall that some forms of dissemination, like music sales and streaming, implicate the exclusive right to copy and distribute, whereas others implicate the exclusive right to perform. Broadcast radio has always implicated only the public performance right in the musical composition copyright.\(^{127}\) In the early 1900s, copyright owners, recognizing the potential for more efficient licensing and an improved bargaining position, united to create a central agent to represent their interests with respect to radio stations and other public performance licensees, such as restaurants.\(^{128}\) This performance rights organization (PRO) is known as the American Society of Broadcasters, Composers, and Publishers (ASCAP). A second PRO, Broadcast Music Inc. (BMI) was established in the 1950s.\(^{129}\)

Among other things, the PROs provide what are known as blanket licenses: a licensee, like a radio station, can receive permission to play every copyrighted work in the PRO’s catalogue in exchange for a royalty. This royalty is then divided among copyright owners according to the PRO’s internal rules.\(^{130}\) This system creates a much more efficient licensing mechanism for both copyright owners and licensees, but also provides copyright owners with significantly more market power than they would otherwise have in individual licensing negotiations. Responding to concerns over the anticompetitive effects of this arrangement, the Department of Justice investigated ASCAP and BMI for antitrust violations. Both PROs entered into consent decrees that remain operative today.\(^{131}\)

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\(^{127}\) Confusingly, this has not extended to sound recordings, which have historically been exempt from copyright protection for radio, as described above. And sound recording licensing for digital and satellite radio are subject to the Section 114 compulsory license. See \textit{supra} Parts I.A.1 and I.C.1.

\(^{128}\) Wu, \textit{supra} note 14, at 305.

\(^{129}\) \textit{Id. supra} note 21, at 1847.

\(^{130}\) DiCola, \textit{supra} note 21, at 1847.

\(^{131}\) See United States v. ASCAP, No. 41-1395, 2001 WL 1589999, 2001-02 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73,474 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001); United States v. BMI, No. 64-civ-3787, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10449, 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), as amended by, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21476, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The consent decrees have also been acknowledged—though not formally codified—in portions of the Copyright Act. For example, Section 104 of the recent Music Modernization Act altered the way that rate court disputes are assigned to SDNY judges. PL 115-264, October 11, 2018, 132 Stat 3676.
The consent decrees function as de facto compulsory licenses, but they are structured quite differently from the industry-wide regimes described in the last Sections. ASCAP and BMI must provide non-exclusive licenses to any licensee that requests one and are subject to royalty rate setting by courts in the Southern District of New York. But rather than periodic industry-wide rate setting, the SDNY rate courts only set royalties if ASCAP/BMI and the licensee cannot reach an agreement.

The consent decrees’ influence on dissemination markets are most apparent in the shadow they cast over private negotiations. As Daniel Crane has shown, rate-setting proceedings are comparatively rare, but the specter of judicial oversight helps galvanize private agreements. That being said, the rate courts have, in recent years, become more active, especially as new forms of dissemination have sought blanket licenses from the PROs. For example, in 2014, the rate court adjudicated a royalty dispute between Pandora and ASCAP. Even while applying the generally accepted “fair market value” standard for such rate proceedings, the court set a rate that is widely considered to be favorable for Pandora, rejecting ASCAP’s requests for rate increases during the latter half of the licensing period.

Despite its longevity, the DOJ has often considered sunsetting the consent decrees and replacing them with free market licensing. Moreover, two newer PROs—SESAC and GMR—are not subject to the consent decrees. Though these PROs are currently invitation-only, their freedom to charge any royalty rate they choose has made them an appealing option for copyright owners dissatisfied with the consent decree system.

132 Id.
133 Id.
136 See, e.g., In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015); see also infra Part I.B (discussing this decision in more detail).
137 Indeed, GMR is currently in litigation over whether it deliberately signed artists away from ASCAP/BMI in order to charge radio stations higher rates, in violation of the antitrust laws. See David Oxenford, Litigation Continues as Court Rejects GMR Motion to Dismiss RMLC Lawsuit — and RMLC’s Request to Dismiss GMR Claims, BROADCAST LAW BLOG (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2020/02/articles/litigation-continues-as-court-rejects-gmr-motion-to-dismiss-rmlc-lawsuit-and-rmlcs-request-to-dismiss-gmr-claims/. SESAC previously agreed to arbitration to address similar allegations. Id.
2. Online Service Provider Safe Harbor

The 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) dramatically changed copyright law to address the rise of internet distribution. One of the DMCA’s greatest innovations is the Section 512 safe harbor for online service providers (OSPs). This safe harbor immunizes OSPs—like search engines, e-commerce sites, and many other digital platforms—from liability for infringing content uploaded by users.\(^{138}\) To be eligible, OSPs must lack direct knowledge of the infringing content, as well as comply with a range of administrative requirements. Most notably, OSPs must provide a mechanism through which copyright owners can request that infringing content be taken down.\(^ {139}\) As failure to abide by any of these requirements can subject the OSP to infringement liability, the courts often play a role in policing the scope of the safe harbor.\(^ {140}\)

Commentary on the 512 safe harbor has tended to focus on its role (along with other internet safe harbors) in allowing for the dramatic growth of social media platforms, as well as its importance for individual creative expression and cultural participation on the internet.\(^ {141}\) But the safe harbors, in recent years, have also become an important mechanism for allowing the dissemination of creative works to the public. By operating primarily as user-uploaded-content platforms, rather than as dedicated streaming services, some internet companies have been able to function in effect as disseminators while still taking advantage of the safe harbor.

The most notable example of this phenomenon is YouTube. YouTube hosts an extraordinarily large range of content, much of which consists of purely user-generated videos posted by their creators. But users also frequently post copyrighted songs or videos in their entirety. Copyright owners can request removal using the take-down mechanisms, but this has quickly become a game of “whack-a-mole” where the removed content is immediately reposted.\(^ {142}\) Thus, YouTube users can access much of the content also available on dedicated services like Spotify and Pandora. But


\(^{139}\) 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).

\(^{140}\) See, e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (assessing scope of safe harbor requirements).


\(^{142}\) Todd Frankel, Why musicians are so angry at the world’s most popular music streaming service, Washington Post (July 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/why-musicians-are-so-angry-at-the-worlds-most-popular-music-streaming-service/2017/07/14/bf1a6db0-67ee-11e7-8eb5-cbcc2e7b1bf_story.html
whereas these dedicated streaming services are required to pay market negotiated (or compulsorily licensed) royalty rates, YouTube, as an OSP, in theory does not have to pay anything as long as it complies with the notice-and-takedown requirements.143

YouTube, however, has recognized that it is often useful to actively license posted content—now often identified through proprietary content ID algorithms—from copyright owners, so as to avoid the notice-and-takedown process and instead monetize the content via advertising.144 But, as some scholars have argued, because the baseline for negotiation is essentially free use—YouTube could always walk away and just allow the 512 safe harbor to take effect—copyright owners have little leverage to demand higher prices. Thus, there is some evidence that the royalties YouTube pays for licensed content are nearly seven times lower than those paid by dedicated streaming services like Spotify,145 though the precise cause of these differences remain unclear.146

This situation has led copyright owners to frequently complain of a “value gap” between royalties received from traditional streaming services and royalties received from YouTube. A decade ago, copyright owners tried to argue that YouTube should be categorically excluded from the safe harbor because infringement is so rampant on the platform that YouTube cannot claim to lack knowledge, as is required by Section 512.147 The Second Circuit, however, rejected such an argument, holding that only “knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements” removes the protections of the safe harbor, and only with respect to those acts of infringement.148 Thus, YouTube and other platforms have continued to enjoy the possibility of seeking

143 García, supra note 70, at 235. To be clear, this Article refers only to YouTube’s non-subscription service. YouTube also operates a convention streaming service called YouTube Music.
144 Among other things, YouTube now uses a content ID system to detect infringing works. YouTube then offers copyright owners the option to license the work in exchange for advertising revenue, rather than taking it down. Sag, supra note 141, at 542; Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 100 CAL. L. REV. 463, 482 (2012).
145 García, supra note 70, at 235.
146 There are other reasons that might explain the fact that YouTube royalties tend to be lower than those of streaming services. In particular, much of the content that YouTube licenses (such as a small piece of a song included in mashup or other follow-on work) is not directly substitutive of music sales, rendering a lower royalty rate more appropriate. See Xiyn Tang, Copyright’s Techno-Pessimist Creep, FORDHAM L. REV. 1151, 1169-71 (2021); Annemarie Bridy, The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”: How the Music Industry Hacked EU Copyright Reform, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3412249.
147 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 29 (2d Cir. 2012).
148 Id. at 30.
protection from the safe harbors, though copyright owners have increasingly sought legislative changes to the status quo.\textsuperscript{149}

3. Section 1201 Exceptions

All of the mechanisms discussed above deal with exceptions to copyright’s exclusive rights to copy, distribute, or perform creative works. Fair use, compulsory licensing, and other limitations all operate within the realm of these exclusive rights. But modern copyright law also employs another set of rules that govern the right to circumvent technological locks, such as encryption, designed to prevent access to or duplication of digitized works. These “anti-circumvention measures” and their exceptions place de facto controls on the diffusion of copyright works, and thus constitute an important and underexplored part of copyright’s law of dissemination.

The anti-circumvention measures of Section 1201 were established in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 out of recognition that when copyrighted works are disseminated in the “digital environment, . . . . [t]here will be those who will try to profit from the works of others by decoding the encrypted codes protecting copyrighted works, or engaging in the business of providing devices or services to enable others to do so.”\textsuperscript{150} Section 1201 addresses this issue in two ways. First, it prohibits anyone from circumventing “access controls” used by the copyright owner to regulate when, how, or by whom a work may be accessed.\textsuperscript{151} These include activities like circumventing a password-protected paywalled website or disabling the decryption codes designed to prevent the playing of a copied video game.\textsuperscript{152} Second, it prohibits the manufacturing or distribution of a device, technology, or service designed to circumvent such access controls\textsuperscript{153} or designed to bypass technical measures that restrict copying.\textsuperscript{154} This might include, for

\textsuperscript{149} The recent EU Copyright Directive has significantly changed to scope of a similar safe harbor in Europe, requiring services like YouTube to proactively block copyrighted content. See Bridy, supra note 145. Similar proposals have been made in the U.S. See, e.g. Draft Digital Copyright Act of 2021, https://www.tillis.senate.gov/services/files/97A73ED6-EBDF-4206-ADEB-6A745015C14B

\textsuperscript{150} H. Rep. (DMCA), p.10.

\textsuperscript{151} 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).


\textsuperscript{153} 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).

\textsuperscript{154} 17 U.S.C. § (b). The direct circumvention of such “copy controls” is not directly prohibited. But, as the courts have noted, that is likely because such direct copying would clearly run afoul of copyright law anyway, while circumventing an access control may not. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
example, software that enables access to or copying of an e-book file purchased by someone else. The statute provides civil causes of action, independent of copyright infringement, for violations of these provisions.

Section 1201 provides what is essentially an alternative means for copyright owners to assert control over dissemination markets. Even if a form of dissemination does not run afoul of copyright’s exclusive rights—for example, via the fair use doctrine—it may sometimes still require circumvention of access controls and thus be impermissible under Section 1201 without permission of the copyright owner. Though some courts have concluded that Section 1201 must be read as coterminous with copyright protection—meaning that any use that does not infringe copyright by its nature cannot violate Section 1201—this is still a minority position.

Instead, Section 1201 provides its own set of exceptions to the anti-circumvention provisions. The enumerated exceptions are primarily designed to allow for certain individual uses deemed to be particularly socially or politically important—for example, research, security and law enforcement, or privacy. But the statute also establishes a triennial notice and comment rulemaking process through which the Copyright Office, in consultation with the Department of Commerce, can establish additional temporary exceptions. This process was meant to be a “fail-safe” to prevent the anti-circumvention measures from preventing “otherwise lawful” activities or impeding “socially vital endeavors.” Accordingly, the rulemaking must be governed by a range of policy-oriented criteria, such as “the availability for use of copyright works” and “the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological measures applied to

155 Section 1201 Report, supra note 152, at 6.
156 Compare Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We conclude that 17 U.S.C. § 1201 prohibits only forms of access that bear a reasonable relationship to the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners.”) with MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer and Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 2010) (rejecting reasoning); MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 2010) (same); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting argument that a fair use of a copyrighted work cannot run afoul of Section 1201).
157 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(d), (f)-(g) (exceptions for library shopping, reverse engineering, and encryption research).
158 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(e), (j) (exceptions for law enforcement use and security testing).
159 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(h)-(i) (exceptions for protecting minors and for personal information).
160 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C). The rulemaking process can only be used to establish exceptions to the access controls prohibition, not the restriction on developing or selling devices designed to circumvent access controls.
copyrighted works has on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.”

Over the last few years, the triennial review process has allowed for several forms of dissemination to temporarily operate without the permission of copyright owners. In particular, the process has been used to allow dissemination of e-books to the print disabled. Transferring such e-books into accessible formats, such as large-text or read-aloud formats, can often require circumvention of access controls, and the Copyright Office has exempted such uses from liability during every triennial review since 2003.

E. Taking stock

The preceding sections outlined a range of different mechanisms that either explicitly or implicitly regulate the relationship between copyright owners and disseminators. Some might object to calling this piecemeal array of doctrines, regulations, and institutions a cohesive law of dissemination. However, in taking stock of this regime as a whole, some interesting features and patterns emerge.

First, all of these mechanisms place limitations on control over licensing from copyright owners. That said, there is an important distinction between them: some provide for uncompensated use, but others utilize a price-setting mechanism. Fair use, the OSP safe harbor, the statutory exemptions, the first sale doctrine, the Section 1201 exemptions, and the Sony secondary liability safe harbor all provide no compensation, while the compulsory licenses, the PRO consent decrees, and the recording device levy provide compensation. The difference here may not be as extreme as it might appear; as some have noted, a safe harbor or affirmative defense to copyright liability can be conceived of in some respects as a “zero-price” liability rule, whereas compulsory licenses are positive-price liability rules. Indeed, several of the compulsory licenses were created by Congress to replace rules

163 Blake Reid, Copyright and Disability at 30-31. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3381201. In its most recent iterations, the regulations established that the non-profits explicitly exempted from copyright liability under Section 121 (the provisions governing access to the print-disabled, discussed above) are also exempted from liability under Section 1201. See 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(3). As discussed further below, this an area where the lack of parity between 1201 and general copyright liability can raise the most problems. Even though dissemination to the print disabled is permissible under both Section 121 and the fair use doctrine, the Copyright Office must still create a specific exemption from Section 1201 liability in order for many such uses to occur.
that previously did not require compensation to copyright owners. As the next Part explores in more detail, the choice between a zero price and positive price liability rule can be related to the specific policy goals that copyright’s law of dissemination may be aiming to achieve.

Second, the institutional contexts in which these mechanisms operate appear initially to be quite different. The courts seem to generally implement the zero-price carveouts—the fair use doctrine, the first sale doctrine, and the like. Most of the compulsory licenses, in contrast, are managed by dedicated regulatory bodies: the Copyright Royalty Board or the Copyright Office as a whole. But there are exceptions on both sides: the courts also engage in rate setting via the ASCAP/BMI consent decrees and the Copyright Office creates exceptions to liability through its Section 1201 triennial rulemaking. Overall, the choice of institution may relate to specific competencies; courts are generally better at engaging in subjective multi-factor balancing, like the fair use test, and administrative agencies are generally better at complex price setting.

Third, relatedly, many similar types of dissemination are regulated across multiple institutions. Music dissemination, for example, is regulated through a staggeringly disjointed set of rules. AM/FM radio pays no sound recording royalties thanks to a specific legislative exception; digital radio pays regulated sound recordings royalties via the Section 114 compulsory license; interactive streaming services pay market-negotiated royalties; YouTube in theory could pay no royalties thanks to OSP safe harbor (though it often chooses to)—and this description does not even scratch the surface of the complexity of music licensing. Similarly, dissemination to the visually impaired is regulated through the Section 121 exception, the fair use doctrine, and the Copyright Office’s administratively created exceptions to Section 1201. As Part III discusses in more detail, this inconsistency and complexity has led to many calls for change to current law.

Fourth, some of the regulatory mechanisms described above are seldomly directly used by copyright owners and licensees, but still regulate dissemination through the shadow they cast over private licensing negotiations. Some of the compulsory licensing provisions are explicitly designed to facilitate private negotiation. For example, the public broadcasting provisions define the CRB’s role as an organizer of private

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165 The section 115 compulsory license and the cable compulsory license were created after the courts found no liability for certain novel forms of use. The Section 114 compulsory license replaced the rule that allowed all forms of radio to perform sound recordings for free. And the recording device levy regime replaced the Sony safe harbor for certain types of devices.
166 See supra Part I.C.1.
negotiations every five years, with rate setting serving only as a backstop.\footnote{See supra Part I.C.3. However, unlike a truly privately negotiated agreement, the industry-negotiated rates apply to any copyright owner irrespective of whether they participated in negotiations.} Similarly, the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees authorize judges to set rates only if the licensee and the PRO cannot come to a negotiated licensing agreement.

Others work more informally to facilitate private agreements. In particular, copyright owners and disseminators frequently reach private agreements for the “mechanical” rights covered by the Section 115 compulsory license for musical compositions.\footnote{Music Marketplace Report, supra note 80, at 29-31.} A primary reason for this practice is the opportunity to customize the specific terms of the agreement, especially regarding payment, and bypass the somewhat onerous formalities of the Section 115 process.\footnote{DiCola & Touve, supra note 76, at 451.} But the CRB-set Section 115 rate generally serves as a de facto cap on private negotiation; after all, a licensee would be unlikely to agree to a higher rate with the knowledge they could walk away from negotiations and utilize the compulsory license mechanism.\footnote{Music Marketplace Report, supra note 80, at 29-31.}

Even zero-price mechanisms likely play some role in facilitating private ordering. This might at first appear counterintuitive; why would a disseminator choose to negotiate when they have the option of using copyrighted works for free? But sometimes the uncertainty over whether a form of dissemination would qualify—or continue to qualify—for an exception can motivate private licensing. For example, some radio stations have agreed to pay royalties to sound recording copyright owners despite being exempt from doing so. Some speculate this may be driven by uncertainty over whether the exemption will remain in place in the future.\footnote{Kristelia A. Garcia, Penalty Default Licenses: A Case for Uncertainty, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1169 (2014).} Fair use presents a similar story; some new disseminators will attempt to license copyrighted works, even if they have a plausible fair use argument, likely out of recognition of the unpredictability of judicial decision-making in fair use cases.\footnote{For example, Google Books initially settled with copyright owners and agreed to compensate them. But the class action settlement was rejected by the court, which then decided the case on fair use grounds. See James Grimmelmann, The Elephantine Google Books Settlement, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 497 (2011).} The cost of compliance with administrative procedures might also play a role in motivating private licensing. As discussed above, YouTube notoriously bypasses the DMCA safe harbor and pays copyright owners royalties in order to avoid the burdensome notice-and-takedown
procedure and instead monetize content on its platform. But, in all these cases, the shadow of the zero-price liability rule will keep royalty rates quite low.

The following Table summarizes some of these commonalities and differences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism:</th>
<th>Source:</th>
<th>Form of intervention:</th>
<th>Administered by:</th>
<th>Regulatory process:</th>
<th>Compensation to rights-holders?</th>
<th>Affected content industry:</th>
<th>Affected dissemination industry:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast radio exception</td>
<td>Statute</td>
<td>Explicit safe harbor</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Broadcast radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publication to print disabled</td>
<td>Statute</td>
<td>Explicit safe harbor</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Publishing</td>
<td>Non-profit distributors to visually impaired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library copying privileges</td>
<td>Statute</td>
<td>Explicit safe harbor</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Publishing</td>
<td>Brick-and-mortar libraries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair use</td>
<td>Common law / statute</td>
<td>Defense to liability (Implicit safe harbor)</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Individual infringement lawsuits</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>All, but especially publishing</td>
<td>Digital repositories, search tools, and more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sony secondary liability safe harbor</td>
<td>Common law / statute</td>
<td>Defense to liability (Implicit safe harbor)</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Individual infringement lawsuits</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Television</td>
<td>Certain recording / playback devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First sale doctrine</td>
<td>Common law / statute</td>
<td>Defense to liability (Implicit safe harbor)</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Individual infringement lawsuits</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Brick-and-mortar libraries and video rental stores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating outside copyright</td>
<td>Common law</td>
<td>Defense to liability (Implicit safe harbor)</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Individual infringement lawsuits</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>All (in theory)</td>
<td>None currently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music compulsory licenses</td>
<td>Statute</td>
<td>Industry-wide compulsory license with regulated rate</td>
<td>Copyright Office / Copyright Royalty Board</td>
<td>Periodic rate setting</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Digital radio, streaming (partially), and jukeboxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable and satellite compulsory licenses</td>
<td>Statute</td>
<td>Industry-wide compulsory license with fixed rate</td>
<td>Copyright Office / Copyright Royalty Board</td>
<td>Periodic distribution proceedings</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Television</td>
<td>Cable and satellite TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public broadcast compulsory license</td>
<td>Statute</td>
<td>Industry-wide compulsory license with regulated rate</td>
<td>Copyright Office / Copyright Royalty Board</td>
<td>Periodic rate setting</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Public radio and television broadcasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recording device levy</td>
<td>Statute</td>
<td>Industry-wide compulsory levy with fixed rate</td>
<td>Copyright Office / Copyright Royalty Board</td>
<td>Periodic distribution proceedings</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>All (in theory)</td>
<td>None currently (Obsolete digital tape recording devices)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCAP &amp; BMI consent decrees</td>
<td>Antitrust consent Decrees / statute</td>
<td>Common carrier obligation with compulsory license backstop</td>
<td>Courts / DOJ</td>
<td>As-needed rate setting</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Broadcast and digital radio, streaming (partially)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSP safe harbors</td>
<td>Statute</td>
<td>Explicit safe harbor with administrative preconditions</td>
<td>Courts</td>
<td>Individual lawsuits</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>All, but especially music</td>
<td>Platforms that also function as disseminators (e.g., YouTube)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1201 exceptions</td>
<td>Statute</td>
<td>Copyright Office</td>
<td>Notice and comment rulemaking</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>All, but especially publishing</td>
<td>Primarily non-profit distributors to visually impaired</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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173 See supra Part I.D.2.
Overall, the patterns and shared features that emerge when comparing the mechanisms that control dissemination of copyrighted works point to what is potentially a shared regulatory agenda. What this agenda is, and how it relates to the copyright system overall, is discussed in the next Part.

II. COPYRIGHT’S DISSEMINATION AGENDA

Recognizing the patterns that emerge across the many regimes that govern the relationship between rightsholders and disseminators does little to explain why such regulation may be necessary. This Part addresses this question by articulating a set of dissemination-related policy goals that seem to be at least partially reflected in current law.

Attempting to explain legislation and regulation can be a fraught enterprise generally, but perhaps nowhere more so than in copyright law. As Jessica Litman and others have documented, much of modern copyright law is the product of backroom deals made by industry players and then codified by Congress with little scrutiny. And it is certainly true that many of the regimes described in the last Part were the products of lobbying. Some can probably only be explained through the lens of political economy. For example, the jukebox compulsory license resulted from the demands of jukebox owners in the lead-up to the 1976 Copyright Act and it is difficult to discern any lasting purpose in it.

While political economy considerations can certainly explain the origins of many of the mechanisms described in the last Part, as well as their general piecemeal, inconsistent, and complex nature, some scholars have taken this account too far, using it to dismiss the idea that copyright contains any normatively sound approach to dissemination. Instead, this Part proposes that part of the difficult in understanding copyright’s law of dissemination is that these regimes likely reflect a complex combination of interrelated policy goals, sometimes expressed in tandem with industry agendas.

174 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 35-63, 122-140 (2006) (describing political economy of copyright legislation at various points in history); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 870-79 (1987) (same, with respect to the 1976 Act); see also Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1197, 1247 (1996) (suggesting that lawmakers’ interest in reinforcing their own privilege can lead them to turn a blind eye to such interest group politics).

175 Samuelson, supra note 98, at 26 & n.183.

176 Liu, supra note 11, at 130–31; see also infra Part III.

177 See sources supra note 4.
Identifying these normative goals requires an exploration of copyright’s policy agenda generally. Copyright, in the Anglo-American tradition, is understood to be a solution to the problem of underinvestment in creative works.\textsuperscript{178} If copyright owners are unable to control and monetize uses of their works, they would lack the incentive to invest in creative enterprises. Copyright creates limited exclusive rights to remedy this problem, and thus provide the public—who are, according to the Constitution, the target beneficiaries of intellectual property—with new, socially valuable works.\textsuperscript{179}

Copyright law, however, also recognizes that too much protection can end up harming the public by allowing copyright owners to impede uses of creative works.\textsuperscript{180} This tension between “incentives” and “access” is frequently invoked in general terms in both case law and scholarship, but the copyright’s “access” agenda is itself multifaceted. The most discussed—and perhaps easiest to understand—conception of copyright’s access policy is linked to copyright’s authorship goal. On this account, the tension inherent to copyright is between immediate creators and future creators: if copyright law is not accompanied with a robust set of limitations, it may thwart its very reason for being by preventing future artists from making use of existing works in their own creative endeavors.\textsuperscript{181} Furthering balance in this area is understood to sometimes require excusing liability—often via the idea-expression dichotomy or the fair use doctrine—in situations where copyright owners have asserted too much control over the raw materials of creativity.

While copyright’s concerns with cumulative creativity is an important driving force in the law’s collection of limitations and exceptions, it does not


\textsuperscript{179} U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”); see also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994) (“The primary objective of the Copyright Act is to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the good of the public.”)

\textsuperscript{180} Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through A Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2004) (“Historically, IP has been characterized by balance. On the one hand, its exclusionary rights provide incentives to create. On the other, its limits preserve roles in the nation's economy and democracy for competition, cumulative innovation, and free expression.”).

\textsuperscript{181} Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 405 (2003) (discussing the notion of “consumers as authors”); Menell, supra note 90, at 470 (discussing copyright’s concerns with “cumulative creativity”).
appear to be the main animating principle behind the regulation of large-scale dissemination of copyrighted works that characterizes the regimes described in the last Part. Copyright’s law of dissemination appears to be more concerned with another aspect of the access equation, one that focuses on the value of public’s ability to easily consume and enjoy copyrighted works in general. Though some have argued that such forms of passive access are irrelevant to copyright’s agenda unless also linked to active follow-on creation, many others have explored the normative value of public access as manifested in various features of copyright law. Such accounts, however, have often been siloed from one another, homing in on specific justifications for specific limitations rather than examining copyright’s dissemination system as a whole.

The rest of this Part attempts to articulate copyright’s normative dissemination agenda, with the aim of understanding how the various regulatory mechanisms explored in the last Part may be justifiable. Doing so requires distilling the voluminous literature on copyright limitations to arrive at four access-focused goals that can help make some sense of copyright’s law of dissemination. Though interrelated and often expressed through the same mechanisms, these four goals are not identical.

First, some of copyright’s dissemination-focused mechanisms simply allow efficient exchanges in the face of prohibitive transaction costs, enabling a greater number of works to reach the public. Second, some of these regimes appear concerned with remediing the distributional inefficiencies generated by copyright’s exclusive rights, enabling uses that expand or enhance consumer access to creative works to go forward. Third, some mechanisms address the overall structure of copyright dissemination industries and help prevent copyright owners invested in specific forms of dissemination from using their market power to prevent new, innovative forms of dissemination from entering the market. Fourth, some of the regimes privilege uses that may not be justifiable from the perspective of allocative efficiency, but make sense

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182 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 3 (1997).
183 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Readers’ Copyright, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 325 (2011) (examining the role of readers, listeners, and other passive users in the copyright system); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975 (2002) (articulating a conception of public access grounded in furthering allocative efficiency and remediing some of the inefficiencies caused by the copyright); Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278 (2004) (examining the role of antitrust-like policy levers in governing copyright markets and helping facilitate the rise of access-enhancing technologies).
184 For example, the literature on the role of antitrust-like policy levers in remedying market power problems in copyright licensing, see infra Part II.C, has not been put in conversation with the literature on policy levers focused on copyright’s inherent inefficiencies, see infra Part II.B.
when considered through the lens of distributive-justice-based accounts of the value of public access to cultural works. All four of these access-related goals are set against the backdrop of copyright’s overall incentives agenda and often demand tradeoffs between access and copyright owner compensation. Many of the regimes include tools that allow decisionmakers to weigh these competing priorities.

Most of the mechanisms that make up copyright’s law of dissemination are explainable through several of these normative lenses, and some are probably not explainable at all except as industry concessions. In this respect, the goal of this Part is not to argue for a simple or definitive justification for copyright’s existing law of dissemination. Rather, the goal is to conceptualize the various ways that the opening up of licensing markets to disseminators is necessary, and explore how the different features of copyright’s market-regulation system can make sense when viewed from these perspectives. To be clear, however, the argument presented here is not that the mechanisms described in Part I necessarily represent the best or only ways to implement the goals identified below. Indeed, as Part III explores in more detail, the existing regime is riddled with problems that must be addressed in order to allow copyright to effectively advance its dissemination agenda.

A. Reducing Transaction Cost Barriers to Licensing

Perhaps the most straightforward explanation for many of the mechanisms described in Part I is the problem of transaction costs. On this account, the high costs of individual licensing negotiations—especially in markets characterized by numerous different copyright owners and licensees—can create a barrier to free market licensing. The state thus steps in to bypass market negotiations and allow uses of copyrighted works to occur cheaply and easily.

A transaction cost-focused account situates copyright’s law of dissemination in the more widely recognized practice of using liability rules to create efficient exchanges in transaction cost-heavy contexts.\(^\text{185}\) For that reason, it has frequently been cited as the primary motivating factor for many of the mechanisms described above, especially compulsory licensing and fair use.\(^\text{186}\)


Allowing for licensing in the face of high transaction costs certainly provides a partial explanation for elements of the music and cable compulsory licenses. Mechanisms like Section 114 allow digital radio services to gain blanket access to all sound recordings, even if those recordings are owned by many different copyright owners.\textsuperscript{187} Section 111 allows cable companies to seamlessly rebroadcast broadcast television without engaging in expensive or time-consuming licensing negotiations.\textsuperscript{188} The public broadcasting compulsory license has similarly been justified because of the “burden” of individual licensing between small public broadcast stations and individual copyright owners.\textsuperscript{189}

Fair use has also been justified as a transaction cost saving mechanism. In particular, Wendy Gordon’s classic theory of fair use as market failure explained that a fair use finding was appropriate in cases like \textit{Sony} because of the unfeasibility of licensing with individual users engaged in recording of television shows.\textsuperscript{190}

While often cited as a predominant (or even the only) justification for copyright limitations that bypass the market,\textsuperscript{191} the role of transaction cost-remediation in copyright’s law of dissemination may be somewhat overstated, both descriptively and normatively. For example, an implication of a transaction cost-focused account of fair use is that technological solutions to barriers to market licensing could render the doctrine unnecessary.\textsuperscript{192} As technology has advanced, however, fair use has continued to be applied, often in situations where licensing markets were indeed feasible. In particular, many of the utility-expanding fair use cases involved situations where licensing markets were realistic, and the courts instead

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\item[187] García, supra note 171, at 1127 (“[C]ompulsory licensing occurs in industries such as sound recordings ... in which individual negotiation with numerous, disparate rights holders would be both time and cost prohibitive.”); Music Marketplace Report, supra note 80, at 163-64.
\item[188] Liu, supra note 11, at 130; see also 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.18 (2020) (discussing similar justifications for satellite rebroadcast compulsory license).
\item[189] Samuelson, supra note 98, at 25 & n.79.
\item[190] See Gordon, supra note 185, at 1613 (advancing theory); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, \textit{The Dual-Grant Theory of Fair Use}, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1051, 1067 (2016) (explaining application to \textit{Sony}). Though Gordon’s theory is frequently discussed in the context of transaction costs-based market failure, Gordon herself has argued that fair use can be justified in many other contexts as well. See Wendy J. Gordon, \textit{Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been Only Part of the Story}, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149 (2003).
\item[191] See sources supra note 186.
\item[192] Bell, supra note 2, at 583.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
justified their decisions based more on copyright policy, rather than transaction cost grounds. Indeed, in the *Google Books* case, the court rejected a class action settlement that would have essentially created a licensing system.\(^{193}\) Transaction costs-based justifications for compulsory licensing have also been overstated. As several commentators have noted, private entities like the PROs could also provide efficient blanket licenses to public broadcasters, as they do for many commercial broadcasters, mitigating many transaction cost problems without the need for price setting.\(^{194}\)

Normatively, an exclusively transaction-costs focused approach does not tell us what *price* copyright owners should pay when the state steps in to remedy a market failure. As the last Part explained, liability exceptions tend to provide copyright owners with no compensation, whereas compulsory licenses provide a positive price. Calculating a price (or determining that zero is appropriate) often requires a deeper inquiry into the allocation goals of the copyright system overall, as the next Section explores.\(^{195}\)

Transaction cost-related market failures may certainly explain some features of copyright’s law of dissemination, but, as the next the remainder of this Part argues, this account must be supplemented with more copyright policy-specific rationales to fully capture copyright’s dissemination agenda.

### B. Reducing Copyright’s Inherent Harm to Consumers

The reduction of transaction costs benefits copyright owners, disseminators, and consumers. After all, enabling exchanges in the face of prohibitive transaction costs allows copyright owners to be compensated, disseminators to make use of copyright works, and the public to receive access to these works.

But, as noted above, the policy goals at the core of copyright also involve a more difficult tradeoff between the importance of remuneration for copyright owners and the public’s interest in access to copyrighted works. A common conception of the value of access focuses on the social harms that can come from providing exclusive rights in creative works to begin with.

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\(^{194}\) Korman, *supra* note 112, at 541-542; see generally Merges, *supra* note 185, at 1306-07. See also Victor, *supra* note 92, at 935 (arguing that music compulsory licenses cannot be explained solely on transaction costs grounds); Liu, *supra* note 11, at 132 (arguing that many features of cable compulsory license do not correspond to transaction cost justifications).

\(^{195}\) See infra Part II.B (examining balancing involved in allocating revenue between rightsholders and disseminators).
This issue is often framed in economic efficiency terms. In order to further its goal of incentivizing creation, copyright law allows copyright owners to price above what they would otherwise be able to charge (which, given the fact that copyright goods are nonrivalrous and cost very little to reproduce, can be close to zero).\textsuperscript{196} Granting copyright owners the ability to charge above marginal cost generates a deadweight loss; some consumers will be priced out even though they would otherwise receive access in a world without copyright protection.\textsuperscript{197} Copyright’s exclusive rights reduce social welfare in other ways as well. In particular, allowing copyright owners to maintain too much control over uses of their work can limit the positive externalities or “spillovers” that such uses can generate, including technological innovation.\textsuperscript{198}

As commentators have noted, copyright is not a “first-best” solution to these problems.\textsuperscript{199} Because it is impossible to know exactly how much compensation is necessary to adequately incentivize creation, copyright uses broad, across-the-board limitations to calibrate the incentives-access tradeoff. Most of these mechanisms constrain the scope or duration of the copyright entitlement. For example, copyright only protects expression, not the ideas that underlie them. Copyrights also only last for a limited amount of time; any work will ultimately end up in the public domain, useable by all.\textsuperscript{200}

While these entitlement-level limitations are copyright’s primary toolset for managing the incentives-access tradeoff, copyright’s law of dissemination can be thought of as attempting to further fine-tune this balancing act in downstream licensing transactions in order to better fit it to the specific use at issue.\textsuperscript{201} By selectively removing copyright owner control in certain circumstances (either with a zero-price carveout or by charging a compulsory price) many of these mechanisms seem designed to increase social welfare by permitting particularly socially valuable disseminative uses to occur, especially in circumstances where copyright’s incentive function is

\textsuperscript{197} Id.
\textsuperscript{199} Adi Libson & Gideon Parchomovsky, Toward the Personalization of Copyright Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 527, 528 (2019); Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond Efficiency: Consequence-Sensitive Theories of Copyright, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229, 240 (2014); Carrier, supra note 180, at 34–35.
\textsuperscript{200} See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1579 (2009) (describing role of such mechanisms in the incentives-access tradeoff); Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 198, at 284 (describing copyright as creating a “semicommons”).
unlikely to be harmed. The remainder of this section identifies two particular strategies that seem to be at play in furthering this goal. First, copyright’s law of dissemination is concerned with bolstering forms of dissemination that enhance the general usability of copyrighted works by the public. Second, parts of the regime help make space for individual uses of copyrighted works, as long as such uses do not too closely veer into widespread dissemination.

**Enabling “utility-expanding” forms of dissemination.** Many of the mechanisms described in the last Part seem concerned with enabling forms of dissemination that enhance the value of creative works for the public. Such access-enhancing tools enable consumer preferences to be better satisfied, such as by allowing users to more efficiently or quickly access creative works, by enhancing the consumer experience of accessing such works, or by enabling users to glean new useful information about such works.

Fair use is one of the tools most frequently used to weigh the social value of such uses against the social value of copyright’s incentive function. Glynn Lunney, in particular, has argued that the fair use doctrine can and has been used to balance, on the one hand, “whether [an] unauthorized use would otherwise reduce the revenue associated with the copyrighted work; and if so, how, if at all, that reduction would likely affect the production of copyrighted works” and, on the other “what the public stands to lose if the use is prohibited.”202 The fair use analysis can attempt to weigh these two interests and “provide a clearer picture of whether a particular use improves social welfare and hence should be considered fair, or reduces social welfare and hence should be considered infringing.”203

As I have argued in past work, the line of “utility-expanding” fair use cases presents a clear example of this balancing act at play.204 Through the transformative use test, described above, courts have been able to allow new access-enhancing technologies, like Google Books, to operate without a license. In such cases, the courts have used the fair use test to weigh the value of the new use to consumers against the social value of copyright owner compensation in a specific licensing market. Indeed, Google Books explained that while “providing rewards for authorship” that incentivize the creation of new works is the primary way copyright serves the public interest, “giving authors absolute control over all copying from their works would tend in some circumstances to limit, rather than expand, public knowledge.”205

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203 *Id.*
204 Victor, *supra* note 44.
205 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 211-212 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 957 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he copyright laws are not intended to discourage or to control the
Fair use, however, is essentially an on-off switch, and this seems to have prevented courts from applying the doctrine to situations where a new dissemination technology threatened to financially harm copyright owners to a large degree. Courts appear to worry that granting what is essentially a zero-price license in such situations would overly harm copyright’s incentive function and thus cannot be justified even if consumers derive a large amount of value from the new form of dissemination. In the TVEyes case, for example, the Second Circuit found that a new form of dissemination was of significant social value because “it enables users to isolate, from an ocean of programming, material that is responsive to their interests and needs, and to access that material with targeted precision.” But, despite this social value, the market harm posed by depriving copyright owners of licensing revenues was too significant to allow for fair use. Several other recent new-technology fair use cases have displayed a similar tension between the social value of a new dissemination technology and the risk to copyright’s incentive function of denying compensation to copyright owners.

Compulsory licensing, on the other hand, has been used to more finely calibrate the rewards to copyright owners and disseminators based on the value derived by consumers. As Peter DiCola has noted with respect to music regulation:

What is Congress doing when it sets up a rate setting process? Ultimately it is engaged in an exercise of allocation. Congress is choosing the process for allocating the surplus from music distribution; that is, the value that consumers experience from listening to music over and above the costs of creating and distributing it. How much of the value of a radio broadcast of a recording comes from the radio station and how much comes from the owners of the sound recording and musical work copyrights?

Though DiCola himself is skeptical of many of the mechanisms utilized to deal with these questions, several parts of copyright’s regulatory price-setting regime do appear to be defined by efforts to assess 1. the costs of creation vs. the costs of distribution and 2. the value to consumers of the work in itself vs. the value of the utility-expanding technology used to disseminate

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emergence of new technologies, including (perhaps especially those that help disseminate information and ideas more broadly or more efficiently.”).

207 Id. at 180.
208 Victor, supra note 44 (outlining cases).
210 See id. at 79–82. Rightly so, in many respects. See infra Part III (discussing disjointed and inconsistent approach to copyright industry regulation).
it, in order to arrive at an optimal division between copyright owners and disseminators.

Conceptualizing this goal can help make sense of what forms of dissemination have been regulated to begin with. Radio presents the most useful example. As the last Part explained, radio is subject to an unusually disjointed set of regulations: Broadcast radio pays no sound recording royalties and digital radio services pay royalties via the Section 114 compulsory license. This unusual division makes some sense when assessed from the perspective of the incentives-access tradeoff. Broadcast radio has historically been exempted from paying sound recordings on the assumption that it provides “airplay and other promotional activities” to recording artists;\(^ {211}\) it not only does not harm copyright owners’ traditional avenues for compensation but often improves sales by promoting artists.\(^ {212}\) Digital radio poses more of a risk to traditional copyright owner markets because it allows better opportunities for customization of the music listening experience.\(^ {213}\) But, as Congress noted when creating the Section 114 license, such “new digital transmission technologies permit consumers to enjoy performances of a broader range of higher-quality recordings than has ever before been possible[,] . . . increase the selection of recordings available to consumers, and make it more convenient for consumers to [listen to music],” thus increasing welfare.\(^ {214}\)

Seen through this lens, terrestrial radio is exempted from paying royalties because the social value of its dissemination role is high and the risk of harm to copyright owners is low. Digital radio, on the other hand, has high social value but greater potential to provide a substitute for copyright owner’s markets, thus harming copyright’s overall incentive function.\(^ {215}\) The Section

\(^ {212}\) See William W. Fisher III, Promises To Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of Entertainment 139 (2004) (explaining this justification); Christopher Buccafusco & Kristelia García, Pay-to-Playlist: The Commerce of Music Streaming at 23 (draft on file with the author) (linking distinction to the prevalence of payola in determining radio plays); see also Picker, supra note 14, at 458-460 (suggesting that the scarcity of radio spectrum, which limits the number of stations that can operate at once, also informed this decision).
\(^ {213}\) See Fisher, supra note 212, at 104-05
\(^ {214}\) S. Rep. 104-128, 14, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 361. To be clear, this analysis does not suggest that the DPRSA was a product of careful policy balancing on the part of Congress. The legislation was driven primarily by lobbying from many different actors, especially terrestrial radio and record labels. Peter Dicola, Matthew Sag, An Information-Gathering Approach to Copyright Policy, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 173, 222 (2012). My main point here is that even industry horse-trading may sometimes arrive at a compromise that at least somewhat reflects a coherent policy approach.
\(^ {215}\) Id. (“[I]n the absence of appropriate copyright protection in the digital environment, the creation of new sound recordings and musical works could be discouraged”).
114 compulsory license, by providing a way to allow dissemination to occur while still compensating copyright owners, represents an intermediate approach.\textsuperscript{216} This value-focused balancing approach can also partially explain how rate setting for the compulsory license regimes has operated in practice. As I have argued in prior work, compulsory music licensing is unusual in that it is often guided by copyright policy-focused rate-setting criteria.\textsuperscript{217} Prior to recent changes that altered the music rate-setting standards, these policy factors asked the CRB to set rates that, among other things, “maximize the availability of creative works to the public” and “reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in the product made available to the public with respect to relative creative contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the opening of new markets for creative expression and media for their communication.”\textsuperscript{218} In applying these factors, the CRB set Section 114 rates for digital radio and satellite radio that, at least in some instances, attempted to compensate these services based on both the costs of developing new dissemination technology and the value they add to the music listening experience for consumers.\textsuperscript{219} Like the utility-expanding fair use cases, these rate-setting decisions represent an effort to disaggregate the value of enhancing access from the value of producing new creative works.\textsuperscript{220} But unlike fair use, the CRB was able to set a positive price that could more carefully split the difference.\textsuperscript{221}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Some have questioned whether it is indeed true that terrestrial radio does not harm copyright owner markets or whether digital radio does not also have promotional value that ultimately benefits music sales. See, e.g., García, supra note 171, at 1135-36; DiCola, supra note 21, at 1880–81; but see Picker, supra note 14, at 158 (defending the distinction as reasonable).
\item Victor, supra note 92, at 962.
\item 17 U.S.C. § 801(b) (2012).
\item See Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound Recordings, 63 Fed. Reg. 25,394, 25,3450-08 (Copyright Office May 8, 1998) (accounting for the services work in “opening a new avenue for transmitting sound recordings to a larger and more diverse audience, including the creation of technology to uplink the signals to satellites and transmit them via cable; technology to identify the name of the sound recording and the artist during the performance; and technology for programming, encryption, and transmission of the sound recording.”); Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, 73 Fed. Reg. 4080, 4096-97 (Copyright Royalty Bd. Jan. 24, 2008) (accounting for costs of satellite maintenance); Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services, 78 Fed. Reg. 23,054, 23,069 (Copyright Royalty Bd. Apr. 17, 2013) (accounting for costs of and value added by satellite services’ “proprietary music distribution system”).
\item Victor, supra note 92, at 935-38, 962-66.
\item Id.
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Even in the absence of explicit policy guidelines, rate-setting entities have sometimes attempted to engage in similar balancing. A useful example can be found in some recent rate-setting decisions in PRO consent decree system. As noted above, in *In Re Pandora*, the rate court was tasked with setting royalties for Pandora’s licensing of musical composition performance rights from ASCAP. Despite having little explicit guidance—the rate court is only charged with setting a market-mimicking rate—the court considered several features of the music licensing market that seem designed to “discern[] a rate that will give composers an economic incentive to keep enriching our lives with music, [but] that avoids compensating composers for contributions made by others either to the creative work or to the delivery of that work to the public.” For example, the court considered whether Pandora was “promotional” or “cannibalistic” of traditional music sales, concluding that it likely was promotional and thus posed little risk of harm to copyright owners’ conventional distribution markets. The court also rejected ASCAP’s argument that Pandora’s alleged success entitles copyright owners to a higher royalty fee, concluding that Pandora’s success is “attributable not just to the music it plays. . . but also to its creation of the [Music Genome Project, a database and algorithms designed to predict users’ musical interests,] and its considerable investment in the development and maintenance of that innovation.” The court concluded that the value added by such innovation weighed in favor of higher compensation for Pandora, rather than copyright owners. Ultimately, considering these factors, the court adopted a royalty rate that many believe is more favorable to Pandora than any they would have been able to receive in an open licensing market.

**Making space for personal uses and sharing.** A second area in which copyright’s law of dissemination appears to address copyright inefficiencies is in creating space for personal, noncommercial uses of copyrighted works by individuals; namely, the freedom to engage in acts of “reading, listening, viewing, watching, playing, and using copyrighted works” without restriction. It is somewhat contestable whether, from the perspective of

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222 *In re Pandora Media, Inc.*, 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d sub nom. *Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors & Publishers*, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[I]n determining the reasonableness of a licensing fee, a court ‘must attempt to approximate the ‘fair market value’ of a license—what a license applicant would pay in an arm’s length transaction.’”).

223 *Id.* at 321.

224 *Id.* at 367–68.

225 *Id.* at 369.

226 *Id.* at 320. Indeed, ASCAP alone appealed the rate, and the Second Circuit ultimately affirmed it. *Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors & Publishers*, 785 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2015).

allocative efficiency, such individual uses should be privileged against copyright’s incentive function in situations where transaction costs do not pose an impediment to licensing markets. But non-efficiency-based accounts of the value of access, such as those oriented around the importance of cultural works for human flourishing, also provide support for limiting copyright’s exclusive rights so as to allow space for individual uses.

In any case, several aspects of copyright law seem designed to restrict copyright owner control over secondary markets so as to allow space for personal uses, including small-scale sharing. The Sony safe harbor essentially prevents copyright owners from demanding licensing revenue from consumers for personal copying, or pursuing technology companies on a secondary liability theory for enabling such uses. And the first sale doctrine allows owners of lawfully obtained works to display or distribute such works on a small-scale basis. Both of these exceptions seem to reflect a recognition that the social value of providing space for personal time shifting or sharing outweighs any potential damage to copyright’s incentive function posed by preventing copyright owners from demanding licensing revenue for such uses.

However, as the line between limited personal sharing and mass dissemination has become hazier—digitization may allow me to seamlessly read an eBook on any of my devices, but it also allows me to transfer that book to as many other users as I would like—courts appear to be unwilling to allow mechanisms like the Sony safe harbor and the first sale doctrine to be used to promote space for personal uses. This provides some explanation for cases like Grokster and Redigi, which limited the doctrines’ applicability. Such cases appeared to recognize that applying broad

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228 Bracha & Syed, supra note 199, at 283 (“In the absence of significant transaction-cost impediments, personal uses... provide a channel for copyright owners to internalize the social value of works, thereby increasing incentives for production of supramarginal works. Under such conditions, there is also no reason to expect that the inframarginal social cost imposed by copyright on these uses will be unusually high compared to other entitlements. The analysis may be complicated by other considerations such as the fact that the newfound enforcement power in regard to personal uses largely depends on technological means and actions by intermediaries, which may be over-inclusive in their sweep. In light of this, it may be difficult to generate definite efficiency-based conclusions.”); but see Lunney, supra note 202, at 1026 (“To the extent that private copying expands access to existing works without decreasing the copyright owner's revenues and the resulting incentive to create additional works, private copying is Pareto optimal and should constitute a fair use.”).


230 Litman, supra note 232, at 1896.

231 Lunney, supra note 202, at 1023.

232 See supra Part I.B.
exceptions to digital dissemination platforms would allow unbridled distribution among users, rather than only small-scale sharing, to the potential detriment of copyright owners’ markets. Implicit in these cases is that the value of personal use in such contexts does not exceed the risk to copyright’s incentive function.

The recording device levy represents an alternative method that seems to be aimed at fine-tuning copyright law’s approach to personal uses in a digital environment. By coupling a broad personal use exemption for users with a mechanism designed to compensate copyright owners—out of recognition that widespread personal digital copying may pose some harm to copyright owners’ dissemination markets—the levy in theory allows for a narrower approach. However, as explained above, the fact that this mechanism was limited only to digital audio tape (DAT) recording technology rendered it almost entirely ineffectual.

**C. Facilitating Market Entry in Concentrated Industries**

The last Section described how copyright’s dissemination-related regimes have been used to address the tradeoff between the social value of incentivizing creativity and the harms of restricting access. But copyright’s law of dissemination also appears to be concerned with a different set of problems that can emerge on an industry-wide level. While these market failures can also harm welfare, they emerge more from the accumulation and aggregation of copyrighted works on a mass-scale, rather than anything inherent to the copyright entitlement. Nonetheless, copyright law appears to have developed its own approach to managing the problems that copyright owner market power can pose.

Tim Wu, in particular, has examined the tools used in the copyright system to address the “problem deriving from copyright’s grant of control over an asset essential to market entry (namely, copyrighted works), and the potential created for vertical foreclosure of rivals.” This account recognizes the fact that copyright owners are frequently invested in a specific form of dissemination—for example, the record labels that own most sound recording copyrights historically utilized record and CD sales as their primary means of monetization. As copyright owners, these incumbent disseminators control a must-have input for any new disseminator—for example, a streaming service that seeks to disseminate copyrighted works must receive permission to use copyrighted musical works in order to operate. As Wu

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233 *Id.*
234 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8B.01 (2020) (discussing legislative history of AHRA).
235 *Id.*
notes, this “bottleneck power” gives incumbent disseminators who are also copyright owners the appealing option of using their control over copyrights to prevent entry to new competitors or to charge a supracompetitive licensing price. What can follow is a socially harmful reduction of innovation in dissemination technologies, as new firms are essentially blocked by incumbents or prevented from growing by high licensing demands.

This bottleneck power is of course a kind of market power. But despite frequent invocations of copyright conferring a “monopoly,” it is important to note that a single copyright interest generally does not itself create meaningful market power. Rather, it is the aggregation of copyrights on a mass scale—either via outright ownership or exclusive licensing arrangements—that can create bottleneck problems. Indeed, Peter Lee has documented in recent work how aggregation of copyrights can yield barriers to entry in distribution. In particular, the “vast libraries” and “copyright estates” of incumbent movie studios, record labels, and book publishers can be leveraged to foreclose entry to rival disseminators. Some new entrants may be able to effectively compete by reaching a significant enough scale or by producing their own creative content—Netflix, for example—but many new entrants face insurmountable barriers.

The behavior of incumbents in blocking or overcharging new disseminators may at first glance seem irrational or counterproductive; such competitors often introduce technologies that have the ability to increase the overall market for copyrighted works, which, when coupled with efficient licensing, should benefit all. But there are multiple reasons why copyright owners may nonetheless leverage their market power to impede new

237 Id. (Wu calls this “vertical foreclosure,” namely, “the use of the protected link to prevent a competing disseminator, or challenger, who depends on the link, from reaching the customer in question. The foreclosure is ‘vertical; because the incumbent uses its control over an independent input at another level (copyrighted materials) to affect competition at the level of dissemination.’); See also DiCola & Touve, supra note 76, at 424–25 (“The relative strength or weakness of copyright law can be thought of as a parameter that increases or decreases the costs of firms that wish to use copyrighted works. . . . [C]opyright becomes a policy lever that, among other functions, increases and decreases distribution firms' costs.”).

238 Wu, supra note 14, at 338 (“From these conditions we can see that granting a copyright entitlement that covers all forms of dissemination will have the effect of giving the pioneer industry the power to control the follow-on development of technology. Assuming that the pioneer controls the creation of content (either by controlling copyrights, vertical integration, or through simple economic dependence), it can dictate what happens and what does not.”); Picker, supra note 14, at 452-53.

239 Bracha & Syed, supra note 199, at 241 (discussing recent work on copyright and product differentiation).


disseminators. Most importantly, incumbent industries frequently suffer from the “innovators’ dilemma,” which causes them to privilege short-term gains and the preservation of existing business models. Indeed, there is a long history of incumbents attempting to prevent valuable new technologies from entering the market.

The market power concerns presented by large-scale copyright aggregation might suggest this problem should fall exclusively within the purview of antitrust law, rather than copyright. But the fact that an incumbent is using intellectual property ownership to control market structure can lead to policy prescriptions different from what a pure antitrust analysis might dictate. As Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna have noted in recent work:

Patent and copyright law are intended to promote innovation and creativity. As a result, different kinds of [industry] disruption arguments matter in cases involving patent and copyright claims than in those involving antitrust and unjust enrichment claims. Where IP is at stake, courts should focus on whether the disruption will do too much to undermine private incentives to invest in new creation.

Indeed, as creators often own or are invested in an incumbent form of dissemination, privileging market entry over the interests of incumbents may sometimes overly reduce the benefits to be gained from incentivizing creativity. On the other side of the equation, however, copyright owners can (and have) used their intellectual property to restrict any market entry whatsoever, and this overreach is also harmful to the innovation of new forms of dissemination. But antitrust law is not necessarily equipped to deal with this problem either. Most of the market power that allows incumbent disseminators to restrict entry comes from their accumulation of a large

242 Id. at 850–53; Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012 Wis. L. Rev. 891 (2012) (discussing “innovator’s dilemma” in context of music dissemination); Wu, supra note 14, at 294–95 (discussing public choice theory insights on why incumbents may attempt to restrict market entry by innovators).

243 See supra Part I.B (discussing origins of compulsory licenses); see also Carrier, supra note 242, at 927 (“One innovator situated the [record] labels’ response to Napster in the historical setting in which the labels ‘fought cassettes, eight-track tapes before that,’ and CDs. They ‘fought every one of those things every step of the way until later they adopted them.’”).

244 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 14, at 113; see also id. at 109 (describing Grokster as a case that correctly privileged the importance of maintaining copyright owner compensation over market disruption by a new disseminator).

number of copyrights, rather than any problematic behavior, like tying arrangements or price fixing.\textsuperscript{246} As Randal Picker has noted, antitrust law is not ideally equipped to handle such legally-obtained market power, even if it ultimately harms welfare by restricting entry of innovative new forms of dissemination.\textsuperscript{247}

Ultimately, the policy goals at play when assessing copyright dissemination from the perspective of industry structure yields a tradeoff that looks quite similar to the incentive-access tradeoff described above, except the importance of “access” is conceptualized around maintaining low barriers to entry for innovators, rather than the directly user-focused problems discussed in the last Section.\textsuperscript{248} Indeed, the Supreme Court has appeared to recognize this tradeoff, noting in \textit{Grokster} the tension “between the respective values of supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting innovation in new communication technologies . . . . The more artistic protection is favored, the more technological innovation may be

\textsuperscript{246} See generally Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property 4-5 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/IPguidelines/download (“As with any other asset that enables its owner to obtain significant supracompetitive profits, market power (or even a monopoly) that is solely ‘a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident’ does not violate the antitrust laws.”).

\textsuperscript{247} Picker, \textit{supra} note 14, at 425-426 (“We know how it works: monopolies, if obtained legally, are fine, it is monopolization that is problematic. Antitrust really is not about calibrating the returns from an innovation or copyrighted work that results in substantial market power and monopoly profits.”); see also Lee, \textit{supra} note 14, at 1276–79 (discussing problems with applying antitrust analysis to copyright markets generally and noting in particular that “identifying instances of ‘problematic’ industry concentration is difficult given that no consensus exists regarding the optimal industry structure for fostering innovation”).

\textsuperscript{248} Wu, \textit{supra} note 245, at 134 (“[W]e should assess intellectual property assignments by their effects on industry structure. In this model, the chief benefit of intellectual property is to subsidize selected industries whose assets are vulnerable to misappropriation. The chief costs are the use of intellectual property rights to block or delay the market entry of threats to intellectual property owners”); Picker, \textit{supra} note 14, at 452-53 (“It is one thing to shape the pliable aspects of copyright law in a way that creates meaningful entry incentives for those with distributional innovations. But we step too far if we allow entrants to hijack wholesale the works of copyright holders.”); Randal C. Picker, \textit{Copyright and Technology: déjà Vu All over Again}, 2013 WIS. L. REV. ONLINE 41, 43–44 (2013) (“The critical question here is how we should calibrate the tradeoffs between copyright enforcement and open-ended innovation.”); Lemley & McKenna, \textit{supra} note 14, at 113 (“Courts [] need to differentiate cases in which disruption would actually interfere with the purposes of IP law from those involving simple harm to the plaintiff that does not interfere with incentives.”); Lee, \textit{supra} note 14, at 1280–81 (discussing tradeoff between innovation in dissemination and new creative enterprises); see also Netanel, \textit{supra}, at 26 (explaining how accumulation of market power by a disseminator can “exacerbate” the access-restricting features of copyright generally).
discouraged; the administration of copyright law is an exercise in managing the tradeoff.”

Several of the mechanisms discussed in Part I indeed appear to be oriented around facilitating entry in copyright dissemination markets. The remainder of this Section provides examples of how copyright’s law of dissemination prevents vertical foreclosure and thus enables market entry of new disseminators, focusing first on compulsory license mechanisms and second on zero-price carveouts.

Compulsory Licensing. Many of the mechanisms described in Part I have helped prevent rightsholders invested in an incumbent form of dissemination from using their market power to bar entry to new, innovative disseminators. As scholars have documented, several of the Copyright Act’s compulsory licensing regimes emerged to resolve disputes between incumbent copyright owners/disseminators and a new, market-threatening form of dissemination. Section 115 helped resolve a dispute between sheet music publishers and new player piano technologies that wanted to make use of copyrighted musical compositions. Section 114 emerged because of clashes between incumbent record labels and new digital and satellite radio services. The cable television compulsory license helped resolve a longstanding dispute between movie and television studios, heavily invested in broadcast dissemination, and new cable dissemination technologies. The satellite television compulsory license emerged because of an essentially identical dispute between broadcast and cable television producers and new satellite technologies. The ASCAP/BMI consent decrees were a similar solution to a dispute between music publishers and radio stations.

All of these mechanisms resolve bottleneck problems in essentially the same way. By requiring copyright owners to license to all comers and by regulating prices, these mechanisms prevent incumbents from using their control over copyright portfolios to bar new forms of dissemination. This account may partially explain why music is disproportionately regulated compared to other copyright industries; consumers generally expect that a radio station, music retailer, or streaming service will provide access to a

250 Wu, supra note 14, at 297; Victor, supra note 92, at 938.
251 FISHER, supra note 212 at 104; Victor, supra note 92, at 953.
252 Wu, supra note 14, at 312.
254 Wu, supra note 14, at 304; see also Statement of Ground for Action, United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers (E.D. Wis. Feb. 5, 1941) (No. 444Q), at 1-3 (discussing concerns over copyright owner market power).
wide array of songs, both new and old, giving copyright owners that own large portfolios of musical works particularly outsized bargaining power.\footnote{See Victor, supra note 92, at 977 (discussing this phenomenon in the context of music licensing by streaming services, which essentially require access to all recorded music in order to successfully compete).}

Recognizing compulsory licenses as a tool for preventing vertical foreclosure can also help explain why private contracting in the shadow of a compulsory license—as occurs quite frequently—may be a useful, even intended outcome. If one goal of copyright’s law of dissemination is to open bottlenecks and enable new disseminators to receive permission to use copyrighted works, then this goal can be achieved by either directly transferring use-rights (via the actual compulsory license) or by simply motivating copyright owners to privately license at reasonable rates when they otherwise would have been able to avoid doing so. Thus, even private deals in the shadow of this regime may show that, in some sense, the regime is working.\footnote{This is not true of the transaction costs justification for compulsory licensing, discussed above. Private licensing may be evidence that purported transaction costs are not actually so prohibitive that a compulsory license is necessary.}

That being said, a compulsory licensing mechanism can often be a relatively time-limited solution to industry structure problems in copyright dissemination. Many of the compulsory license regimes were galvanized by court decisions that had immunized a new technology from copyright liability entirely.\footnote{See supra Part I.C (discussing origins of mechanical compulsory license and cable compulsory license).} Congress, responding to these decisions, implemented a more balanced approach that would allow for both market entry and copyright owner remuneration. But these responses were often limited to a specific technology and did not foresee even newer forms of dissemination. For example, the cable compulsory license allowed cable disseminators to enter the market but a new compulsory license had to be created when satellite disseminators tried to do the same. As discussed further below, the fact that internet-based disseminators, like Aereo, have now been barred from using the existing compulsory licensing regimes perhaps shows that a highly specific compulsory license will always be most useful in the early years of the new form of dissemination it regulates, but will ultimately become outmoded and may even begin to cement incumbent power at the expense of new entrants.\footnote{See infra Part III.}

But even a compulsory license that is not designed to facilitate new modes of dissemination can still have continued importance in maintaining reasonable prices in an existing licensing market. As the last Section explored, one way that license rate setting has done this is by attempting to
set prices that weigh the value of disseminators’ contribution to the consumer experience against the value added by copyright owners. Another aspect of this price regulation is accounting for market power imbalances that might skew prices too high in an unregulated market. The rate court judges for ASCAP and BMI are explicitly instructed to account for the fact that a PRO, “as a monopolist, exercises market-distorting power in negotiations for the use of its music” and factor this into its attempt to find a “fair market value” rate.259 In applying this standard, the courts have rejected marketplace evidence from the PROs if it appears to be tainted by market power problems.260 The CRB, under the current “willing buyer and willing seller” rate-setting standard has no explicit mandate to consider market power, but nonetheless rejected marketplace evidence in the last Section 114 proceeding because it was drawn from a market that lacks competition.261 Though copyright owners challenged this rejection as inconsistent with the rate-setting standard, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the CRB’s decision.262

Exceptions from liability. Zero-price carveouts from liability can also play an important role in enabling market entry. In particular, the OSP safe harbor has been justified as a way to prevent the prospect of secondary liability from impeding growth and competition within the new OSP industries.263 And, as explained above, a de facto result of the safe harbor is that services that blur the line between content platforms and disseminators can essentially operate without a license (or, as with YouTube, by licensing on favorable terms).264

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260 See, e.g., id. at 357 (rejecting evidence of existing licensing deals because they were tainted by the copyright owners having used “their considerable market power to extract supra-competitive prices”).


262 SoundExchange, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 904 F.3d 41, 56-57 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding that it was reasonable for CRB to read an effective competition requirement into the “willing buyer and willing seller” rate-setting standard). Of course, a background question in all of these decisions is what a “free market” rate even should look like in a market that has always been subject to compulsory licensing. See Victor, supra note 92, at 986-93; García, supra note 171, at 1141 (noting that a “a standard intended [] to emulate fair market value by looking at what a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to in a hypothetical marketplace” is contradicted by “the fact that there is not, and never has been, a ‘market’ for digital radio because that business model has operated under the statutory license since its inception.”).

263 Menell, supra note 11, at 137–38; Wu, supra note 14 at 356; Picker, supra note 248, at 43.

264 See supra Part I.D.2.
The Sony safe harbor can also be framed as a market-entry mechanism. As several scholars have noted, the Sony decision prevented movie studios and other copyright owners from using their control over copyrights from essentially blocking the VCR from the market through the threat of litigation or prohibitively high licensing demands. The first sale doctrine has played a similar role in allowing libraries and video rental companies to operate without restrictive licensing demands from copyright owners who may want to steer consumers towards purchasing, rather than renting, copyrighted content.

But the growing judicial discomfort with applying wholesale liability exceptions to new digital dissemination technologies—Grokster with respect to the Sony safe harbor, Redigi with respect to the first sale doctrine, and Aereo with respect to operating outside the bounds of copyright’s exclusive rights—shows the limitations of using a zero-price carveout to promote industry entry. The tradeoff identified above recognizes that copyright owner investment in incumbent forms of dissemination means that overly privileging the market entry of industry-disruptive innovators through a zero-price carveout may reduce creative incentives to too high a degree. This concern appears to have animated some of the recent cases. For example, the opinion in Grokster explicitly noted the “tension” between “supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection” and “limit[ing] further development of beneficial technologies,” ultimately concluding that the “the number of infringing downloads that occur every day using [] Grokster’s software” meant that the copyright owner interests were greater.

D. Enabling More Equitable Distribution of Cultural Works

The three preceding explanations of copyright’s law of dissemination are all grounded in an allocative efficiency-focused account of copyright’s policy goals. The use of liability rules in the face of high transaction costs aims to create efficient exchanges between copyright owners and users; the use of carveouts or compulsory licenses to fine-tune the tradeoff between the


266 See supra Parts I.B.2–4 (discussing these cases).

harm of exclusive rights in information and the need to incentivize creative works aims to maximize social welfare; and the use of compulsory licenses and carveouts to facilitate market entry aims to remove barriers to beneficial, market-driven innovation. But there is a broader account of copyright’s balancing act that eschews framing access to creative works solely in terms of efficiency. These accounts have instead focused on the value of access for individual autonomy, cultural enrichment, free speech, democratic governance, and, in particular, distributive justice. As Oren Bracha and Talha Syed have documented, these theories may overlap with an efficiency-oriented approach in some contexts, but depart in others. They also, for the most part, recognize the value of providing remuneration to copyright owners, but instead weigh these benefits against the harm that overprotection can cause to non-efficiency-derived values.

A full account of these theories is beyond the scope of this Article. But some are particularly helpful in explaining features of copyright law that appear to privilege certain forms of dissemination designed to provide more equitable access to certain kinds of cultural works. This Section outlines three specific areas: libraries, public broadcasting, and special forms of dissemination for the print disabled.

Libraries. The ability of libraries to lend books to the public for free is generally enabled by the first sale doctrine, which exhausts copyright owner rights in follow-on selling and lending of objects that embody copyrighted works. As discussed in Part I, the Copyright Act also establishes several statutorily-defined exceptions designed to allow libraries to engage in various archival and preservation activities. Most important from a dissemination perspective, libraries are permitted to copy and distribute sections of books or periodicals, and occasionally entire works, to users.

The application of the first sale doctrine to libraries, as well as the Section 108 exceptions, make particular sense when considering the special social role of the library in enabling access to information and culture. As Rebecca Tushnet in particular has documented, libraries can be thought of as “repositories of nonmarket-based access to information and creative works,”

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269 Bracha & Syed, supra note 199, at 231.

270 Bracha & Syed, supra note 199, at 247.


272 See supra Part I.A.3.
and, in so doing, help enable democratic participation and cultural enrichment.\textsuperscript{273} Libraries also further distributive-justice goals by allowing those with limited resources to access creative works regardless of ability to pay.\textsuperscript{274} The first sale doctrine and Section 108 enables libraries to fulfill such roles without regard for the market-driven licensing demands of copyright owners.

\textbf{Public broadcasting}. Public broadcasting, like the public library system, is another avenue of non-market-driven dissemination generally understood to be of special social importance. In the lead up to the 1976 Act, which established the compulsory license for public broadcasting, Congress noted “that encouragement and support of noncommercial broadcasting is in the public interest” and maintained that “special treatment” of stations through a compulsory license was necessary because of the “special nature of programming, repeated use of programs, and, of course, limited financial resources.”\textsuperscript{275} Though little scholarly work has been done on the public broadcasting compulsory license and its effects, this regime, like the library exceptions, might be understood as an attempt to bolster the activities of non-profit entities that enable the public’s cultural enrichment regardless of ability to pay.

\textbf{Dissemination to the print disabled}. The final example of an area of special treatment in copyright’s law of dissemination are the carveouts that permit technologies to reproduce and distribute works in accessible forms, such as Braille or read-aloud. Section 121, along with the fair use doctrine, has provided broad permission for non-profits, like the Hathitrust Digital Library, to bypass the exclusive rights of copyright owners in creating dissemination technologies for use by the print disabled.\textsuperscript{276}

These carveouts seem to rest on specific distributive justice concerns that are rarely given credence in other areas of copyright law.\textsuperscript{277} Through using a “form of cross subsidy internal to the copyright regime,” the provisions attempt to ensure that the print disabled can receive access to


\textsuperscript{274} Bracha & Syed, \textit{supra} note 199, at 308; Panezi, \textit{supra} note 37 (examining special role of libraries in providing equitable access to information).

\textsuperscript{275} H.R. Rep. 94-1476, 116-17, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5732-33; see also Korman, \textit{supra} note 112, at 537-44 (discussing history of this provision).

\textsuperscript{276} See \textit{supra} Part I.A.2.

\textsuperscript{277} Bracha & Syed, \textit{supra} note 199, at 302 (grounding these provisions in distributive justice concerns and explaining why a pure efficiency analysis likely would not explain their scope).
cultural works on a level playing field with other members of the public.\footnote{Id. 303-04.} Indeed, the court in \textit{HathiTrust} explained that such exceptions to copyright’s exclusive rights are a specific tool for “ameliorating the hardships faced by the blind and the print disabled.”\footnote{Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 102 (2d Cir. 2014)} As Blake Reid has argued in recent work, these efforts were implemented after a long history of copyright law ignoring the needs of the disabled, and even the current Section 121 provisions are still very limited.\footnote{Blake Reid \textit{Copyright and Disability}.} Nonetheless, the exception for the print-disabled appears to be a relatively unusual example of Congress and the courts altering the normal channels of copyright licensing markets in order to explicitly further a distributive justice goal.

The Section 1201 exception process has provided additional support for this goal by excluding certain print-disabled uses from the DMCA’s anti-circumvention rules.\footnote{See supra Part I.D.3.} Thanks to this exception, non-profits can not only disseminate works without running afoul of copyright liability, but can also transfer them to accessible formats, such as read-aloud, without risking liability under the anti-circumvention provisions. Of course—as many have argued—a world without liability for anti-circumvention would also accomplish this goal. But considering this additional liability regime does exist, the 1201 exception process represents an important feature of how copyright’s law of dissemination grapples with distributive justice concerns.

Interestingly, Section 1201 is also the one area of copyright law in which a notice and comment rulemaking process has been used to generate exceptions. This has allowed for frequent input from civil society and public interest-oriented organizations.\footnote{Section 1201 Report, \textit{supra} note 152, at 22-25 (discussing public participation in rulemaking); see \textit{also}, e.g., Section 1201 Rulemaking: Seventh Triennial Proceeding to Determine Exemptions to the Prohibition on Circumvention Recommendation of the Acting Register of Copyrights (Oct. 2018) \url{https://cdn.loc.gov/copyright/1201/2018/2018_Section_1201_Acting_Registers_Recommendation.pdf}.} In contrast, most other mechanisms for copyright lawmaking—legislation, infringement lawsuits between copyright owners and disseminators, or CRB proceedings—usually only involve industry players.

The following Table summarizes some of the apparent normative goals of copyright’s dissemination-related mechanisms:
The foregoing analysis identified a set of dissemination-related normative goals that are necessary to a well-functioning copyright system. Some of copyright’s existing doctrines and regulatory regimes seem to at least partially reflect these goals, often utilizing mechanisms designed to further greater public access, encourage innovation, and promote distributive justice without compromising copyright’s overarching goal of incentivizing the creation of new works. Despite being largely born from industry lobbying rather than thoughtful regulatory design, copyright’s law of dissemination thus exhibits more normative coherence than is conventionally believed.

That being said, copyright’s current dissemination-related regimes are far from the optimal way of achieving the policy goals described above. Indeed, these doctrines and regulatory institutions are frequently criticized by both copyright owners and disseminators. This Part examines several areas of critique, focusing primarily on the regime’s complexity, inconsistency, and failure to accommodate new technologies of dissemination. Many of these problems might be traced to policymakers’ failure to acknowledge that

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copyright law contains within it a cohesive approach dissemination. In this respect, the reframing advanced by this Article aims to set the stage for future proposals on how copyright’s law of dissemination might be improved.

**Complexity.** First, copyright’s dissemination-related mechanisms are frequently criticized for being overly complex and poorly designed. Compulsory licensing regimes are criticized in particular for the intricacies of their rate-making processes and the burdensome formalities required to take advantage of the regimes.  

This poor design not only leads to frequent disputes about the scope and meaning of various administrative rules, but have has required multiple small-scale interventions by Congress, at the behest of industry players, to remedy unforeseen problems. Most recently, for example, the 2018 Music Modernization Act removed a burdensome individual notice requirement for the Section 115 compulsory license, instead allowing streaming services to receive a blanket license to use all music composition copyrights. This limited effort, however, left in place many of the other inefficiencies in the Section 115 regime, and even introduced new problems.

Complexity thwarts dissemination policy in several ways. Repeat players are able to use their expertise in proceedings like rate setting or Section 1201 rulemaking to promote their own interests, leading to economically unsound rate-setting decisions, and even allegations of

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284 See, e.g., DiCola & Sag, supra note 87, at 229-31, 234-37 (discussing Congress’s frequent interventions in the Section 114 regime, such as the Small Webcasters Settlement Act of 2002).


286 See Loren, supra note 93 at 2526-31 (criticizing MMA’s decision to codify interpretation of Copyright Act that requires streaming services to pay mechanical royalties to begin with); Victor, supra note 92 (criticizing new rate setting criteria introduced in MMA).

287 In a recent example, the D.C. Circuit found that the CRB had failed to justify the evidence it used in setting rates under the Section 115 license and remanded to the board for a new determination. See Johnson v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 969 F.3d 363, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
regulatory capture. Relatively, the Copyright Office lack the resources to fully govern the many complex regimes under its auspices, leading to underenforcement. Complexity is also costly—copyright owners and disseminators must invest in expert lawyers and economists in order to navigate the system. All of this can encourage parties to avoid using an otherwise useful mechanism, as well as create prohibitively high barriers to entry for potential new competitors.

Inconsistency. Second, copyright’s dissemination regime is remarkably inconsistent. Within highly regulated industries, like music and television broadcast, similar types of dissemination are subject to very different forms of regulation and some are entirely unregulated. The music regime is notoriously inconsistent. When it comes to sound recording royalties, AM/FM radio pays no royalties, digital radio stations pay compulsory licensed royalties, and streaming services pay market-negotiated royalties. The PROs ASCAP and BMI are subject to consent-decree rate setting, but newer PROS, like SESAC and GMR are not. Within television broadcast, cable and satellite services pay a compulsory licensed fee to rebroadcast network television but digital services must negotiate a market-based license. And libraries maintain robust lending privileges when it comes to hard-copy books, thanks to the first sale doctrine, but no similar privilege for e-books, which must be licensed from publishers. As Part II explained, some of these distinctions—such as free use for terrestrial radio vs. compulsory licensed use for digital radio—may reflect a meaningful policy choice stemming from the potential for harm to copyright owners. But others likely defy reasoned explanation.

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290 Music Marketplace Report, supra note 80, at 12 (“Those seeking to launch new delivery platforms are constrained—and sometimes even defeated—by the complexities and expense of convoluted clearance processes.”).
292 See supra Part II (exploring how the balance between the public benefits of a form of dissemination and harm to copyright’s incentive function may determine the choice between a free, compulsorily licensed, or market negotiated licensing regime).
293 See generally DiCola, supra note 21, at 1851 (criticizing inconsistencies in music regime); García, supra note 70, at 234-35 (same).
Regulation is also inconsistently applied across different content industries. Certain industries, like music and television broadcast, are riddled with interventions, while others, like film distribution, are mostly unregulated. While this may reflect the fact that industries like music have been characterized by persistent transaction cost and market power problems,\(^{294}\) applying the same criteria across all content industries might justify increased regulation in other areas.\(^{295}\) Regardless of its reasons, inconsistent regulation frequently yields allegations of unfairness and distrust of regulators.\(^{296}\)

**Adapting to New Technology.** Third, and perhaps most importantly, copyright’s law of dissemination has failed to keep up with technological changes, leading the regime to become increasingly narrow in scope. This phenomenon is especially apparent when assessing the judicially administered safe harbors described above. Nearly all of these safe harbors have been limited by recent judicial decisions: in particular, the first sale doctrine does not apply to digital distribution,\(^{297}\) the fair use doctrine has been held not to apply to several innovative forms of dissemination,\(^{298}\) and a capacious reading of copyright’s exclusive rights has prevented innovative services, like Aereo, from operating outside the scope of copyright.\(^{299}\)

Such decisions may sometimes rest on solid normative foundations—after all, when a disseminator can use works for free such that copyright owners have no meaningful source of remuneration, copyright’s incentive function is put at risk.\(^{300}\) Indeed, in the past, Congress removed several zero-price careveouts—such as the rule that cable broadcasters were immune from liability when rebroadcasting television—out of a belief that copyright owners required remuneration. However, when previously removing such safe harbors, Congress adopted alternative regulatory mechanisms that would

\(^{294}\) See supra Part II; see generally Victor, supra note 92 (discussing these problems with respect to music streaming).

\(^{295}\) See generally Jacob Victor, Copyright and Vertical Integration (early-stage manuscript) (examining problems posed by rise of vertically integrated production and dissemination companies in areas like television and movie streaming).


\(^{297}\) Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 657-659 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2760, 204 L. Ed. 2d 1148 (2019); see also supra Part I.B.3.

\(^{298}\) See, e.g., Fox News Network, LLC v. Tveyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 177 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 595, 202 L. Ed. 2d 428 (2018); see also supra Part I.B.1; Victor, supra note 44.


\(^{300}\) This, for example, was the clear rationale behind cases holding filesharing platforms like Napster secondarily liable. See supra Part I.A.2.
allow innovative disseminators to function by controlling price and enabling market entry. 301 Thus, rather than replacing the cable carveout with free market licensing, Congress created the cable compulsory licensing. In practice, these compulsory licensing mechanisms have often shown themselves able to balance between copyright owner compensation and the normative goals reflected in copyright’s law of dissemination. 302

In recent years, however, the courts’ limitation of the scope of various safe harbors has generally not been accompanied by the creation of alternative regulatory mechanisms or the extension of existing mechanisms to new areas. Therefore, when courts have denied use of a zero-price carveout to a new disseminator, the end result is that such technologies are subject to the full market power of incumbent copyright owner/disseminators in licensing arrangements (or risk an injunction or prohibitively high statutory damages in an infringement lawsuit, as occurred in Redigi, Aereo, and Grokster).

Aereo’s experience is particularly illustrative: after the Supreme Court rejected Aereo’s argument that its television distribution system fell outside the scope of copyright’s exclusive rights, 303 it attempted to operate under the cable compulsory license. But the courts adopted a narrow interpretation of the scope of that regime, holding that Aereo was ineligible to use it. 304 This left Aereo subject to the full scope of copyright’s property-rule remedies, as well as the licensing demands of copyright owners, which left the service unable to continue most of its operations. 305

In this respect, the courts’ and Congress’s failure to replace safe harbors with new compulsory licenses (or extend existing compulsory licenses to new technologies) has created a lock-in effect that plainly undermines the goal, discussed above, of fostering market entry of new innovative technologies of dissemination. Under the status quo, disseminators that operate using older modes of dissemination (radio, digital radio, book lending, cable, satellite) have a range of regimes that they can use to operate easily and often cheaply. But any technology that arose after the creation of the current regimes (on-demand streaming, digital TV distribution, e-book lending) is out of luck, leaving them subject to the often prohibitively high licensing demands of copyright owners or the risk of bankrupting litigation. 306

301 See supra Parts II.B-C; see also Wu, supra note 14.
302 See supra Part II.B; see also Victor, supra note 92.
304 See supra Part I.C.2.
305 Id.
306 For a discussion of why copyright owners often try to block technologies that may ultimately increase distribution of their works, see supra notes 241-245 and accompanying text.
A similar failure-to-update can be seen in other sectors of copyright’s regulatory regimes. The AHRA recording device levy, for example, was designed to be a compromise solution that would allow for individual content sharing while still ensuring copyright owners were compensated. But this regime, which was limited to digital audio tape technology that failed to become widespread, was quickly rendered ineffectual.\(^\text{307}\) Ironically, it is likely that one of the reasons that the digital audio tape never caught on was because newer technologies, like MP3, could operate free from the levy requirements and thus had a much easier time outcompeting the regulated technologies.\(^\text{308}\)

Finally, the copyright’s dissemination regimes that are focused on promoting free access to culture have also failed to react to technological change. Most importantly, it is unclear whether the first sale doctrine or fair use doctrine covers the ever-increasing use of digital books by libraries. Libraries’ practice of “controlled digital lending”—in which libraries use digital rights management technology to limit the circulation of digital copies—is increasingly under attack by rightsholders.\(^\text{309}\) Section 108’s copying privilege also has unclear applicability to digital distribution, limiting its utility in enabling small-scale research uses.\(^\text{310}\)

The following Table summarizes how copyright’s law of dissemination has failed to keep pace with technological change:

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\(^{307}\) See supra Part I.C.4.
\(^{308}\) See discussion supra Part I.C.4 (discussing RIAA’s failed efforts to apply AHRA to MP3).
\(^{310}\) See Tushnet, supra note 268, at 992 (noting limitations of Section 108 generally).
There is no single explanation for why these problems have emerged. Political economy is certainly one factor; as explained above, Congress has largely delegated copyright legislation to industry players, and new legislation most frequently emerges through industry compromises or lobbying, rather than thoughtful institutional design.311 The difficulties of crafting regulation in two-sided markets may also play a role.312

But these problems likely also stem from the fact that the lawmakers, judges, and regulators who administer copyright’s dissemination-focused

311 See supra discussion accompanying notes 174-175. Relatedly, in recent work Dave Fagundes and Saurabh Vishnubhakat have argued that copyright lacks a coherent “administrative law” that appropriately delegates responsibilities to entities like the Copyright Office, CRB, and USPTO according to their respective competencies and with the necessary resources. Fagundes and Vishnubhakat, supra note 289.

regimes tend look at their choices in isolation, rather than reflecting any kind of cohesive approach to dissemination within copyright. While a judge adjudicating a case like *Aereo* and a regulator assessing the prices of compulsory royalties do not currently view their tasks as related, an implication of this Article is that they should. Only by laying out the full scope of copyright’s normative approaches to dissemination, and the ways it is currently manifested, can an improved and updated law of dissemination be developed.

This diagnosis, of course, does not tell us what such a regime should look like. This would require advancing prescriptions for how copyright’s law of dissemination can be reformed to more effectively accommodate a world in which dissemination is almost entirely digital; such a task is beyond the scope of this Article. Future work will take on this task, assessing what a better functioning and more comprehensive law of dissemination might look like. But the descriptive account laid out in this Article aims to provide a necessary foundation for ensuring that such prescriptions build on the existing regime and can learn from its successes and failures.

**CONCLUSION**

Copyright’s many different dissemination-regulating institutions and doctrines display more commonalities than is conventionally believed. These similarities suggest a necessary reframing: we should not think of these mechanisms as sui generis, but rather as part of a broader law of dissemination within copyright, with a specific set of normative goals. This law of dissemination has played, and continues to play, an important role in safeguarding the public’s interest in access to creative works without compromising copyright’s creative-incentive function. Though the current regime is riddled with problems, the reframing advanced in this Article will hopefully provide necessary grounding for more thoughtful regulatory design in the future.