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Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues (RERCI)

RERCI Articles

Revenue Sharing as Compensation for Copyright Holders

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 8, No. 1, 51-97, 2011

Richard Watt

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Abstract

Essential inputs are an important topic of debate for economics. One common essential input is intellectual property, in the form of either patents or copyrights, which the producers of goods and services for final consumption must necessarily purchase from the input supplier. The ensuing monopoly power of the input supplier leads in many cases to controversial outcomes, in which social inefficiencies can occur. In much of the literature on the economics of intellectual property, it is assumed that the right holder is remunerated either by a fixed payment or by a payment that amounts to an additional marginal cost to the user, or both. However, in some significant instances in the real-world, right holders are constrained to use (or may choose to use) a compensation scheme that involves revenue sharing. That is, the right holder takes as remuneration a part of the user's revenue. In essence, the remuneration is set as a tax on the user's revenue. This paper analysis such remuneration mechanisms, establishing and analysing the optimal tax rate, and also the Nash equilibrium tax rate that would emerge from a fair and unconstrained bargaining problem. The second option provides a rate that may be useful for regulatory authorities. The model is calibrated against a (hypothetical) scenario in which the copyright holders in music are paid a regulated share of the revenue of music radio stations, a topic that is presently at the fore-front of the economics of copyright pricing.

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The 'Competitive' Value of Music to Commercial Radio Stations

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 4, No. 2, 29-50, 2007

Paul Audley and Marcel Boyer

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Abstract

Our objective in this paper is to develop a methodology to infer from the behaviour and choices of broadcasters the "competitive" value they attach to the use of music, more precisely sound recordings, and to derive from such an inferred value the proper "competitive" copyright payments to be made to authors, composers, performers, and makers of sound recordings. We illustrate the methodology by applying it to Canadian data. The background is provided by the statement of case and supporting proof presented in the 2004 proceedings before the Copyright Board of Canada on the commercial radio tariff. The results called for a significant increase in copyright payments by Canada's commercial radio industry: the proper competitive copyright payments should be substantially more than double what the industry was paying at the time of the hearings.

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Royalty Rate Setting for Sound Recordings by the United States Copyright Royalty Board: The Judicial Need for Independent Scholarly Economic Analysis

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 12(1/2), 1-15, 2015

David R. Strickler

Downloads:  268


Abstract

Judges who set copyright royalty rates through litigation, like all trial Judges, are constrained by the evidence and testimony. Thus, we can only determine rates that are supported by the record. For the record to be sufficient, testifying economists must be able to apply a sufficient body of work in the economics of copyrights. In my address to the 2015 SERCI Congress, I emphasized the judicial need for continued and comprehensive research in this field, so that testifying economists can provided a foundation for our determinations. In this article, I explore such issues in more detail.

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Intellectual Property Rights and Cultural Heritage: The Case of Non-Cumulative and Non-Degenerative Creation

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 1, No. 2, 97-117, 2004

Veronique Chossat and Christian Barrere

Downloads:  265


Abstract

This paper studies the case of cultural and creative goods that onstitute both private and common heritage assets and analyses the difficulties involved in protecting them by the means of IPRs. The specificities of non-cumulative and non-degenerative creative heritage assets prevent any universal model of protection and thus the building of a market of IPRs. The standard model of property rights is partially irrelevant depending on the specificities of cultural heritage assets. So strategic behaviours concerning the uses of cultural heritage assets can arise. Two creative industries are studied: Haute Couture and French Grande Cuisine.

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Efficiency Considerations in Copyright Protection

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 1, No. 2, 11-27, 2004

Marcel Boyer

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Abstract

Many countries are revisiting their Copyright law in the light of new communication and information technologies, which make possible the generalized digitization of copyrighted material and in so doing hallenge the protection and enforcement of copyrights. As the laws are modified to adapt to this new environment, the foundations of copyright have been questioned. I claim here that the affirmation and protection of a strong and transparent copyright framework is a second best efficient institutional arrangement to foster cultural development and diversity and promote the emergence of new market-like institutions reducing the costs of transactions between creators and users.

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Decreasing Copyright Enforcement Costs: The Scope of a Graduated Response

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 6, No. 2, 13-29, 2009

Olivier Bomsel and Heritiana Ranaivoson

Downloads:  264


Abstract

The digitization of copyrighted goods and the dematerialization of their distribution over the Internet have caused a weakening of copyright, a key institution of the creative industries. One reason is that, during the broadband roll-out, copyright enforcement costs have become superior to the estimated benefits of copyright. This paper analyses the causes of this situation and suggests how a graduated response to infringers can decrease copyright enforcement costs.
The paper starts with a review of the economic literature on copyright that focuses on its industrial aspects. It then analyses how, all along the distribution vertical chain, the consumer's impunity provides incentives to free ride on copyright, which rapidly increases copyright enforcement costs. It finally depicts the graduated response mechanism and the voluntary agreement that initiated this system in France. In conclusion, the increase in the cost of free-riding for the final consumer should lead to a decrease in copyright enforcement costs and to higher returns in the creative industries.

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Radio Airplay, Digital Music Sales and the Fallacy of Composition in New Zealand

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 7, No. 1, 67-81, 2010

Mehnaz Bandookwala

Downloads:  262


Abstract

I examine the effect that radio airplay has on the sale of digital music in New Zealand. This effect is also likely to influence the behavior of various music industry participants, including the record companies, radio industry and listeners. I find that on an industry level, radio airplay has no significant effect on the sale of digital music. However, on average, an increase in radio airplay of a given song is predicted to increase sales of that song, which is the so-called exposure effect. The discrepancy between the aggregate and individual effects is explained by the existence of the fallacy of composition: An increase in the airplay of a particular song usually happens at the expense of another song's airplay, and so if more airplay does give greater sales of a given song, so less airplay will reduce the sales of competing songs, leading to ambiguous aggregate effects. It is also true that while individual songs compete with other songs for airplay, the radio industry competes with other activities and products consumed by listeners. Increases in the total airplay may not increase total sales, as the listener's decision regarding digital single purchase is now made with consideration of their non-music consumption goods, and budget and time constraints.

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Value Based Pricing of Music

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 12(1/2), 16-25, 2015

T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford and Michael L. Stern

Downloads:  257


Abstract

In the regulatory setting of rates for statutory-licensed music services, the question of value-based versus cost-based rate setting for the component-rights of a musical performance arises. In this article, we have demonstrated this value-or-cost question is a distinction without a difference. Starting with the value-based concept of second-best (or Ramsey) prices, we end with a result prescribing that cost differences should be fully reflected in compensation across the inputs to the music recording. Each price is set so that the costs are covered, no more and no less.

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Introduction: Copyright and the Publishing of Scientific Works

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1-6, 2010

Richard Watt

Downloads:  255


Abstract

This paper is the introduction to the symposium "Copyright in Academic Publishing".

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Open Standards and Interoperability in EU Digital TV: Economics and Policy Issues

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 5, No. 2, 45-70, 2008

Nicola Matteucci

Downloads:  248


Abstract

The quest for interoperability of interactive TV has been a major concern of the EU Institutions. Its policy foundations were built on the enabling role of open standards, whose peculiar standardization process should guarantee affordable and widespread intellectual property rights. After having received considerable public support and financial funds, the interactive TV roll-out appears disappointing, and the diffusion of the main concerned standard, the multimedia home platform, stagnates. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the main market facts and passages of interactive TV policy, to derive a multifaceted assessment of its technological, economic and institutional drivers. Several important issues stand out. Besides the inner complexity of the policy, a few normative inconsistencies and conflicting aims adversely impacted its feasibility. Several logical ambiguities also dampened the correct choice of instruments. In particular, the existing literature clarifies two main points: open standards cannot be uncritically assimilated to open source software, and the role of open standards along the broadcasting value chain is largely unexplored. Consequently, their effects here might differ from those experienced in traditional information and communication technologies markets. Finally, a certain evidence of regulatory capture of the EU policy-maker emerges.

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The Incentives for Contributing Digital Contents Over P2P Networks: An Empirical Investigation

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 5, No. 2, 19-35, 2008

Fabrice Rochelandet and Tushar K Nandi

Downloads:  248


Abstract

In this paper, we examine the determinants of sharing behaviour by envisaging two types of behaviour, namely contribution against free riding. In doing so, we evaluate the theoretical predictions about reciprocity and altruism in the presence of non-rival goods and anonymity. We use a probit model and primary data from a survey that collects information about P2P sharing behaviour of more than 2000 individuals. Our econometric results suggest that the motivations for contributing are poorly determined by rational self-interested behaviour. We then envisage policy implications in terms of copyright enforcement and business.

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DRMS, Economics, Copyright and Competition Law: The Australian Experience - The Economic Implications of Stevens v Sony

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 3, No. 2, 67-82, 2006

Yee Lim

Downloads:  248


Abstract

This paper will examine the Sony Playstation litigation in Australia where Sony claimed the device it used in its Playstation consoles was a technological protection measure ('TPM'). The outcome of the High Court of Australia decision is somewhat different from similar litigation run by Sony in other countries. Section 3 of this paper will examine the economics of TPMs and in particular, the device which Sony claimed in its Australian litigation was a TPM. It will reveal that copyright owners such as Sony already possess strong market incentives to implement TPMs and that the level of competition is inversely related to the incentive to protect works through TPMs. Section 4 of the paper will introduce the competition law landscape in Australia and it will analyse, within the context of Australia's competition laws, the device used by Sony which it claimed was a TPM. It will demonstrate that the use of the device by Sony is arguably conduct in breach of s46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974. Section 5 will examine the role of the law in Australia in terms of incentivising the use of TPMs.

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Technological Transformation, Intellectual Property Rights and Second Best Theory

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 4, No. 2, 5-28, 2007

Richard G. Lipsey

Downloads:  246


Abstract

Over the last decade, the research interests of myself and my co-authors have concerned economic growth, technological change and general purpose technologies - pervasive technologies that transform our whole society. Our many publications culminated in Economic Transformations: General Purpose Technologies and Long Term Economic Growth by Richard Lipsey, Kenneth Carlaw and Cliff Bekar (hereafter LCB). This work has only incidentally raised issues concerning intellectual property rights (IRPs). So what I will cover in this paper is first a brief survey of some of the historical parts of LCB. Then, I give some general discussion of economic policy with emphasis on second best issues and, finally, some of the IPR issues that arose incidentally in our work.

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Digital Rights Management and Hardware Market Power

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 13(2), 25-65, 2016

Jin-Hyuk Kim and Michael Waldman

Downloads:  245


Abstract

Digital Rights Management (DRM) is employed by firms as a way of reducing illegal copying. In this paper we investigate the idea that it can also be associated with an increase in market power in the hardware market. In our main analysis content and hardware are complementary goods, where there are multiple hardware sellers and one of the hardware sellers owns a DRM technology that can be developed into a DRM system that makes legal content incompatible with hardware that does not employ the system. Our primary result is that the hardware producer who initially owns the DRM technology may employ closed DRM to gain market power in the hardware market because this is an efficient way to monetize its initial ownership of the technology. We also show that, depending on whether or not the content developer has positive bargaining power, the introduction of DRM may or may not result in an increase in content development. In addition to investigating these ideas in a number of related theoretical settings, we also consider the social welfare aspects of the argument and discuss its relevance for understanding the early history of Apple's iPod.

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Considering the Risk Dimension in the Administration of Copyright

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 5, No. 1, 75-87, 2008

Ana Maria Tetrel

Downloads:  243


Abstract

In the law and economics literature of copyright, the economic function of collecting societies has been principally treated as a way to diminish transaction costs. However, another possible function, the transfer of risk as a function of collective administration has been, relatively, ignored. Through risk analysis, an author will be able to determine which method of administration of protected rights is most beneficial to him. Due to information asymmetries, authors and users bear a number of risks. These risks can be transferred to a collecting society which is in a better position to bear them more efficiently and to better administer the protected rights.

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