The Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues (RERCI)

RERCI Articles

Remarks to the SERCI Panel on Regulatory Copyright Tariff Setting

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 14(1/2), 45-54, 2017

Gerry Wall

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Abstract

This Panel concerns possible lessons for European copyright practitioners learned from the North American experience. I pose two key questions that arise from our existing copyright tariff setting processes: 1) do we need regulatory intervention to achieve appropriate prices?; and 2) how has the process worked so far and how can we make the process better?

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Free Software and Intellectual Property in Brazil: Threats, Opportunites and Motivations

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 2, No. 2, 95-109, 2005

Antonio M. Buainain and Cassia I. C. Mendes

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Abstract

This article discusses the implications of the intellectual property system as applied to software, especially the use of patents, for innovation in developing countries; it also assesses the possible consequences of the appearance of free software and a new intellectual property system in the innovation process in countries such as Brazil; finally, it attempts to analyse the new dimension of intellectual property as well as its context in the current debate on 'global patents' as opposed to a more flexible copyright system. Some of the questions discussed are: Is a more flexible copyright system an instrument to promote technological innovation? Does the reduction of the income of some software companies in developed countries point toward an exhaustion of the sales model of user licenses for software? What are the threats and opportunities for the new business model based on free software and copy left in Brazil? Can the motivations for the use and development of free software promote the Brazilian software industry?

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Digital Technology, Price Discrimination, and Copyright Duration Extension

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 7, No. 2, 39-55, 2010

Michael Y. Yuan

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Abstract

Many countries have yet to decide whether extend copyright duration. Technological changes were cited by a U.S. Senate report to support duration extension. This study adds to the assessment of the validity of the technological argument by simulating the effect on optimal copyright duration of increased price discrimination caused by digital technology. Simulation of a model of information product market indicates that increase of price discrimination on high-end market calls for shorter copyright duration; that on low-end market may support extension, if the discrimination benefits consumers, and otherwise work against it. It further suggests price discrimination on low-end market increases welfare and supply of original information products but that on the high-end market may either increase or decrease them.

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Music-Use Tariffs, Options, Regulation and Bargaining

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 2019, vol. 16(1/2), pp. 40-67

Frank Mathewson, E. Jane Murdoch and Gerry Wall

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Abstract

This paper discusses the connection between rate regulation and bargaining out- comes. We consider the case of licensing musical works for radio broadcasting. Our model illustrates the impact when music broadcasters can switch to a talk format. Using a generalized Nash bargaining setting, we interpret the revenue sharing rules established within the regulatory regimes in the US and Canada. In any negotiations over a sharing rule with the collectives that own the musical works rights, the ability of broadcasters to switch from a music to a talk format constitutes the threat point for the broadcasters. Using US and Canadian data for 2014 and 2015, we derive the bargaining weights that would generate the same revenue flows for broadcast- ers and collectives as those produced under the shadow of a copyright regulatory regime. These numerical examples show a higher weight to collectives than appears from the stated tariff rates.

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The Relative Effectiveness of Global Anti-Piracy Policies

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 2018, 15(1), 1-19

Tylor Orme

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Abstract

In recent decades, the problem of illegal downloading of copyrighted material has emerged as a major concern for governments across the globe. Many countries have implemented policies to limit the impact of online piracy on revenues of creative industries. These policies, while important for a broad range of industries, have been particularly lobbied for and supported by the motion pictures industry. Film production and distribution companies have repeatedly asserted that effective anti-piracy policy is crucial to their continued success. This paper seeks to evaluate whether the anti-piracy regimes in OECD countries have been effective. It also seeks to determine whether there are patterns to the types of policies that have been especially effective or ineffective.

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Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Social Surplus from Creation

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 2, No. 1, 45-67, 2005

Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine

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Abstract

In the modern theory of innovation, monopoly plays a crucial role both as a cause and an effect of creative economic activity. Innovative firms, it is argued, would have insufficient incentive to innovate should the prospect of monopoly power not be present. This theme of monopoly runs throughout the theory of growth, international trade, and industrial organization. We argue that monopoly is neither needed for, nor a necessary consequence of innovation. In particular, intellectual property is not necessary for, and may hurt more than help, innovation and growth. We show that, in most circumstances, competitive rents allow creative individuals to appropriate a large enough share of the social surplus generated by their innovations to compensate for their opportunity cost. We also show that, as the number of pre-existing and IP protected ideas needed for an innovation increases, the equilibrium outcome under the IP regime is one of decreasing probability of innovation, while this is not the case without IP. Finally, we provide various examples of how competitive markets for innovative products would work in the absence of IP and critically discuss a number of common fallacies in the previous literature.

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Private-Collective Software Business Models: Coordination and Commercialization Via Licensing

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 4, No. 1, 47-61, 2007

Heli A. Koski

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Abstract

Private-collective business models that involve both private investment incentives and the production of public goods are not well understood. This empirically oriented research uses a unique data from the software industries of five European countries (Finland, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain) to illuminate the patterns of private, entrepreneurial provision of software placed in the public domain. The estimation results strongly suggest that the highly restrictive GPL works as an efficient coordination mechanism for the (leading) developers of the OSS community and spreads particularly via the firms that have participated in the OSS development projects. The software companies supplying the OSS, instead, tend not to aim at using the GPL to coordinate the further development of their own OSS. Rather the firms are the origin of more flexibly licensed OSS products though generally the software firms' OSS business strategies relate to the restrictive licensing strategy choices.

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Revenue Sharing as Compensation for Copyright Holders

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 8, No. 1, 51-97, 2011

Richard Watt

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Abstract

Essential inputs are an important topic of debate for economics. One common essential input is intellectual property, in the form of either patents or copyrights, which the producers of goods and services for final consumption must necessarily purchase from the input supplier. The ensuing monopoly power of the input supplier leads in many cases to controversial outcomes, in which social inefficiencies can occur. In much of the literature on the economics of intellectual property, it is assumed that the right holder is remunerated either by a fixed payment or by a payment that amounts to an additional marginal cost to the user, or both. However, in some significant instances in the real-world, right holders are constrained to use (or may choose to use) a compensation scheme that involves revenue sharing. That is, the right holder takes as remuneration a part of the user's revenue. In essence, the remuneration is set as a tax on the user's revenue. This paper analysis such remuneration mechanisms, establishing and analysing the optimal tax rate, and also the Nash equilibrium tax rate that would emerge from a fair and unconstrained bargaining problem. The second option provides a rate that may be useful for regulatory authorities. The model is calibrated against a (hypothetical) scenario in which the copyright holders in music are paid a regulated share of the revenue of music radio stations, a topic that is presently at the fore-front of the economics of copyright pricing.

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Considering the Risk Dimension in the Administration of Copyright

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 5, No. 1, 75-87, 2008

Ana Maria Tetrel

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Abstract

In the law and economics literature of copyright, the economic function of collecting societies has been principally treated as a way to diminish transaction costs. However, another possible function, the transfer of risk as a function of collective administration has been, relatively, ignored. Through risk analysis, an author will be able to determine which method of administration of protected rights is most beneficial to him. Due to information asymmetries, authors and users bear a number of risks. These risks can be transferred to a collecting society which is in a better position to bear them more efficiently and to better administer the protected rights.

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When Should the Bell Toll? The Economics of New Zealand's Debate on Indirect Liability for Internet Copyright Infringement

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 1, No. 1, 119-149, 2004

Alan E. Woodfield

Downloads:  364


Abstract

This article evaluates proposed changes to New Zealand's copyright legislation in respect of potential secondary liability for copyright infringement by Internet service providers. Minor changes were envisaged in order to align the legislation with new international standards, with limitation of ISP liability along the lines of the UK Electronic Commerce Regulations 2002 recommended. Both zero liability and strict liability for web-hosting ISPs are correctly rejected, but the proposed uniform regulatory approach provides limited incentives for ISP monitoring effort and while proposed knowledge-based standards should largely prevent excessive permanent removal of legitimate material, the constructive knowledge test may be insufficient to encourage the removal of many infringing items. The counter-notification procedure may not prevent liability-conscious ISPs from removing excessive legitimate material on a temporary basis, and more radical solutions involving ISP purchase of their subscribers' posted material or compulsory ISP purchase of copyrights did not feature. The design of optimal copyright law is fraught with difficulties, however, and the Ministry's consultative processes and careful deliberations have done much to maintain a reasonable balance between the conflicting interests concerned.

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DRMS, Economics, Copyright and Competition Law: The Australian Experience - The Economic Implications of Stevens v Sony

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 3, No. 2, 67-82, 2006

Yee Lim

Downloads:  359


Abstract

This paper will examine the Sony Playstation litigation in Australia where Sony claimed the device it used in its Playstation consoles was a technological protection measure ('TPM'). The outcome of the High Court of Australia decision is somewhat different from similar litigation run by Sony in other countries. Section 3 of this paper will examine the economics of TPMs and in particular, the device which Sony claimed in its Australian litigation was a TPM. It will reveal that copyright owners such as Sony already possess strong market incentives to implement TPMs and that the level of competition is inversely related to the incentive to protect works through TPMs. Section 4 of the paper will introduce the competition law landscape in Australia and it will analyse, within the context of Australia's competition laws, the device used by Sony which it claimed was a TPM. It will demonstrate that the use of the device by Sony is arguably conduct in breach of s46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974. Section 5 will examine the role of the law in Australia in terms of incentivising the use of TPMs.

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Indirect Copyright Infringement Liability for an ISP: An Application of the Theory of the Economics of Contracts under Asymmetric Information

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 2018, 15(2), 57-79

Richard Watt and Frank Mueller-Langer

Downloads:  355


Abstract

Under current copyright law in many countries, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can be found liable for the traffic on the websites that they host. While the ISPs themselves are not undertaking acts that infringe copyright, indirect liability asserts that they either contribute to, or encourage in some way, infringing activities, and thus they are liable to claims of indirect involvement by the affected copyright holders. The present paper explores indirect liability in a standard principal-agent setting, where both moral hazard (the act of monitoring) and adverse selection (differential costs of monitoring over ISPs) are present. The model considers the kinds of contracts that could be signed between the copyright holders (acting through a collective) and the ISPs (acting individually). We specify the contracts that are self-selecting and incentive compatible for the set of feasible scenarios.

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Royalty Rate Setting for Sound Recordings by the United States Copyright Royalty Board: The Judicial Need for Independent Scholarly Economic Analysis

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 12(1/2), 1-15, 2015

David R. Strickler

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Abstract

Judges who set copyright royalty rates through litigation, like all trial Judges, are constrained by the evidence and testimony. Thus, we can only determine rates that are supported by the record. For the record to be sufficient, testifying economists must be able to apply a sufficient body of work in the economics of copyrights. In my address to the 2015 SERCI Congress, I emphasized the judicial need for continued and comprehensive research in this field, so that testifying economists can provided a foundation for our determinations. In this article, I explore such issues in more detail.

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Introduction to RERCI Vol 14(1/2)

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 14(1/2), 0, 2017

Richard Watt

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Abstract

Introductory comments to the present issue of the journal.

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The Spanish Copyright Commission (Section I) Within the European Legal Framework

Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 14(1/2), 39-44, 2017

Raul Rodriguez

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Abstract

Directive 2014/26/EC foresees that EU member States shall ensure that disputes between collective management societies and users concerning, in particular, existing and proposed licensing conditions or a breach of contract can be submitted to a court, or if appropriate, to another independent and impartial dispute resolution body where that body has expertise in copyright law. The Spanish Copyright Commission (Section I) aims to be that body in Spain. In order to reach this objective, the Commission has been empowered with new functions that will probably reduce the existing conflicts related to copyright licensing.

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