Abstract

This paper uses a strategic entry-deterrence framework to analyze the effects of enforcement sharing between the government and the monopolist in dealing with commercial copyright piracy. The monopolist is the incumbent firm and is responsible for monitoring the illegal operations of a commercial pirate, the possible entrant, who illegally reproduces and sells unauthorized copies of the monopolist's product. The monopolist bears the monitoring cost and the government is responsible for setting a penalty. We show that even when enforcement is shared the socially optimal penalty may result in no piracy in equilibrium only if the government is sensitive to piracy.

Abstract

As an alternative to the current copyright system (FLC), indefinitely renewable copyright (IRC) has not been compared to the current system in international settings. We compare them in a two country setting. We find that optimally configured IRC does not necessarily lead to higher national or global welfare than an optimally configured FLC.

Abstract

Over the last decade, the research interests of myself and my co-authors have concerned economic growth, technological change and general purpose technologies - pervasive technologies that transform our whole society. Our many publications culminated in Economic Transformations: General Purpose Technologies and Long Term Economic Growth by Richard Lipsey, Kenneth Carlaw and Cliff Bekar (hereafter LCB). This work has only incidentally raised issues concerning intellectual property rights (IRPs). So what I will cover in this paper is first a brief survey of some of the historical parts of LCB. Then, I give some general discussion of economic policy with emphasis on second best issues and, finally, some of the IPR issues that arose incidentally in our work.

Abstract

The visual artist's resale royalty right entitles an artist to a percentage of the price received by subsequent owners when her works are resold. Adopted by the integrity of EU countries in 2006, the question of the Federal recognition of this right in the US is currently discussed. Economic analysis of this right mostly concluded its inefficiency. In this paper we examine the issue from the stand point of incentives provided by each legal framework, with and without this right, for the artists. We argue that an optimal mechanism designed to implement a maximum level artistic effort in the society coincides with the adoption of this right.

Abstract

The optimal level for copyright has been a matter for extensive debate over the last decade. Using a parsimonious theoretical model this paper contributes several new results of relevance to this debate. In particular we demonstrate that (a) optimal copyright is likely to fall as the production costs of 'originals' decline (for example as a result of digitization) (b) technological change which reduces costs of production may imply an increase or a decrease in optimal levels of protection (this contrasts with a large number of commentators, particularly in the copyright industries, who have argued that such change necessitates increases in protection) (c) the optimal level of copyright will, in general, fall over time as the stock of work increases.

Abstract

Copyright is supposed to establish a mechanism under which content users contribute to creators' income, thereby providing incentives for creators to create new and original content for end-users to consume. However, in the current digital environment one can suggest that this arrangement is breaking down. The necessary flow of content is not being achieved in such a manner as to provide a satisfactory flow of revenue back to the creators, or is it vice versa? It can also be argued that the copyright system is not providing enough revenue for distributors to provide the sort of services that users would like with the current pricing structures, use restrictions and rights complexity demanded by the major controllers of music copyrights. In this essay I consider the current state of affairs regarding the copyright system, and its effects for all participants along the value chain for protected content.

Abstract

The Berne Convention was the first attempt to recognise the copyright of foreign authors and their translations. I create a unique dataset to analyse the long run effects of the Berne Convention in 1912 in the Netherlands. Using pre-post statistical analysis and regression discontinuity design I find a significant decrease in the number of books translated per capita and an increase in translations per author.

Abstract

The Information Society is closely linked to both communication processes and to the market exchange of information goods. Therefore the production of copyrighted works represents today a significant part, both quantitatively and qualitatively, of the economies of post-industrial countries. And in this scenario copyright is increasingly playing a pivotal role in markets.

Abstract

An extensive literature has developed that argues that in many settings the social welfare costs of copying or piracy are limited because of the presence of indirect appropriability. Indirect appropriability is the idea that original good producers can appropriate some of the value derived by the consumers of copies because of the return that buyers of original units receive from allowing copies to be made. In this paper we discuss the limitations of indirect appropriability, where the two we focus on are the "flooding" of the copy market and substitutability between new units and copies. We also discuss the ramifications of our analysis for real world markets.

Abstract

Collective performing rights licensing agencies are private enterprises and their files are thus not public. Thus, the possibilities to carry out scientific research regarding the effects of performing right fees have been limited. This paper is based on new unique data provided by the Swedish Performing Rights Society (STIM) which has provided data for a large share of Swedish composers of art music with mandates from them for this study as legal requisites. The point of departure for the analysis is the basic monetary incentive theory which holds that the prospect of revenues will result in more output. Another question is whether royalty income plays a substantial role in the total incomes of composers or not. Furthermore, three factors, which are generally considered to be influential when it comes to the size of composer incomes in Sweden, are also analysed: gender, level of education and choice of domicile. Female composers are found to earn substantially less than males. Whereas in most professions higher levels of education increase income this seems to be less important for composers. Finally, the expectation is that a composer living in the national capital, Stockholm, will earn more than others is not substantiated.

Abstract

This paper discusses the regulations which limit the monopolistic and monopsonistic power of the Music Copyright Society of China (MCSC) in the context of the broader legal framework for the collective management of music copyright in China. The paper identifies "inadequate regulation" as a major cause of the misuse of such market power by the MCSC. Using a comparative approach, the paper analyses the regulatory regime that addresses the abuse of the market power of the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), the two oldest performing rights organisations (PROs) in the United States. Drawing lessons from the United States experience, this paper challenges the notion that establishing more musical collective management organisations (CMOs) in China would decrease the monopolistic and/or monopsonistic power of the MCSC. While the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law cannot be applied to regulate the market power of the MCSC, this paper advocates for improving the current Regulations on Copyright Collective Administration (RCCA) as an alternative option for preventing the misuse of power by the MCSC.

Abstract

This article evaluates proposed changes to New Zealand's copyright legislation in respect of potential secondary liability for copyright infringement by Internet service providers. Minor changes were envisaged in order to align the legislation with new international standards, with limitation of ISP liability along the lines of the UK Electronic Commerce Regulations 2002 recommended. Both zero liability and strict liability for web-hosting ISPs are correctly rejected, but the proposed uniform regulatory approach provides limited incentives for ISP monitoring effort and while proposed knowledge-based standards should largely prevent excessive permanent removal of legitimate material, the constructive knowledge test may be insufficient to encourage the removal of many infringing items. The counter-notification procedure may not prevent liability-conscious ISPs from removing excessive legitimate material on a temporary basis, and more radical solutions involving ISP purchase of their subscribers' posted material or compulsory ISP purchase of copyrights did not feature. The design of optimal copyright law is fraught with difficulties, however, and the Ministry's consultative processes and careful deliberations have done much to maintain a reasonable balance between the conflicting interests concerned.

Abstract

Undoubtedly, the idea of strong property rights is the underlying idea of economics and one of the main sources of economic incentive. In his paper, Prof. Shavell (see Shavell, 2009) seems to question and eventually impugn the idea of the economic efficiency of property rights in the market place of ideas in the academic world. In this regard, I will criticize his paper with the economic methods and will explain how Prof. Shavell's idea of the abolishing copyrights for the academic works might suffer from inconsistencies and also lacks the merits in generating a more economically efficient atmosphere for the academic works.

Abstract

Copyright has been increasingly internationalized and, recently, more and more harmonized. However, there has been little theoretical study of international copyright. This paper develops and analyzes a non-cooperative two-country model of copyright, where two countries trade in information goods and each with an open and competitive information goods industry sets copyright policy to pursue self-national interest. The model suggests that an increase in demand for information goods in a country calls for longer copyright protection in this country and shorter protection in its trading partner; decreases in fixed or per-product creative costs in a country with lower such costs call for marginally shorter protection; and an improvement in the economies of creative scale in a country with better economies of creative scale calls for marginally longer protection. Understanding these rational responses of nations to changes in creative technologies and markets should be helpful for international copyright-policy making.

Abstract

This article traces the origins and evolution of the paying public domain (or domaine public payant), from its foundations in 19th century France, particularly as exposed in two famous speeches delivered by Victor Hugo, to its current versions in force in a handful of Latin American and African countries. We analyse the economic aspects of the copyright-public domain relationship. We emphasise the contrasts between original and contemporary versions of the paying public domain and provide a hypothesis to explain its mutation and subsistence.